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Abstract	
Strategic	management	is	one	of	the	core	responsibilities	of	Top	Management	Teams	
(TMT).	Unlike	established	TMTs,	newly	appointed	TMTs	may	lack	the	expertise	and	the	
routines	for	effective	strategy	development.	Little	is	known	about	how	such	teams	engage	
in	strategy	making,	and	how	well	they	succeed	in	formulating	effective	strategies.	While	
this	is	a	common	situation,	for	instance,	when	high-growth	SMEs	start	adopting	more	
formal	strategic	management	processes,	it	has	received	only	limited	attention	in	strategy	
research.		
Based	on	the	strategy-as-practice	framework,	this	study	intended	to	gain	insight	into	the	
practices	that	newly	appointed	TMTs	employ	to	formulate	a	new	strategy	and	into	the	
effect	of	these	practices	on	the	formulated	strategy.	A	group	of	nine	managers,	who	were	
promoted	from	operative	roles	to	form	a	new	TMT,	was	followed	for	a	seven-month	
period.	Qualitative	data	were	collected	through	participant	observation	and	face-to-face	
interviews.	Document	analysis	was	used	for	the	analysis	of	the	formulated	strategy.		
The	results	of	the	study	suggested	that	cohesion	development	in	a	newly	appointed	TMT	
may	hinder	strategic	exploration	and	ideation	practices.	Newly	appointed	TMT	members	
also	appeared	to	limit	broader	organizational	participation	in	the	strategy	process.	
Moreover,	being	promoted	from	operative	roles	to	strategic	roles,	TMT	members	tended	
to	focus	on	internal	matters.	As	a	result,	the	strategy	formulated	by	the	newly	appointed	
TMT	failed	to	address	the	firm’s	competitive	position,	but,	instead,	emphasized	internal	
change.	It	was	proposed	that	newly	appointed	TMTs	should	establish	group	cohesion	and	
develop	proper	collaboration	practices	before	engaging	in	strategic	projects.		
The	findings	of	the	study	contribute	to	the	knowledge	on	the	effects	of	TMT	tenure	and	
group	cohesion	on	strategy	formulation.	Further	research	could	validate	the	findings	in	
strategy	implementation	processes	and	study	the	impact	of	organizational	collaboration	
on	strategy	formulation.				
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The importance of strategy in the global business environment 
“Ongoing political, economic, social, environmental and technological 
developments are challenging many of our underlying assumptions. 
Across every sector of society, decision-makers are struggling to cope with 
heightened complexity and uncertainty resulting from the world’s highly 
interconnected nature and the increasing speed of change.” 
Klaus Schwab, Founder and Chairman of the 
World Economic Forum, 2015 
Strategy is about making choices that ensure survival of the firm in the face of 
competition. Strategic management is the primary concern of the firm’s senior 
management, whose role is to define the set of integrated strategic choices that 
makes a strategy, and which will influence success or failure of the firm. 
(Rumelt, Schendel & Teece 1999, 9.) Enterprise strategies consists of a single 
corporate and one or more business strategy dimensions. In short, corporate 
strategy tells where a firm competes in terms of industries and markets, while 
business strategy tells how the firm competes within a specific industry or 
market (Grant 2013, 19). Knowing that a firm seeks to respond to changes in 
the environment by means of an adequate strategy, it is good to reflect on how 
that environment looks like, from the perspective of an industrial firm.  
During the recent decade, enterprises operating in the international 
environment have been confronted with a new kind of global trade. While 
international trade in the 20th century was a matter of goods crossing borders, 
trade in the 21st century is characterized by a more complex and 
interconnected set of cross-border flows of goods, services, technologies, 
investments and physical and human capital (World Trade Organization 2013, 
39). While facing a future of rising complexity, many enterprises are still 
trying to recover from the past, namely the turbulence that started with the 
2008 global financial crisis and that regardless of sporadic recoveries has 
caused a lasting contraction of global trade (World Bank 2015, 3). Positive 
economic forecasts that were made in 2014 had to be revised soon because of 
rising geopolitical tensions, an unforeseen drop in commodity prices, a series 
of natural disasters, the continued presence of global monetary and financial 
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risks and social instability in many regions. All this lead to the question 
whether the traditional forecast models are still valid in the current global 
environment. (World Trade Organization 2015; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2015a, 35-43.) 
A persistent feeling of uncertainty and a structural break in the globalisation 
trend seem to have appeared in the shadow of the global trade slowdown 
described above. Uncertainty with firms and consumers has led to delayed 
investment decisions and might have the strongest impact on global trade; a 
break in globalisation trends might be more difficult to prove, although 
indications in this direction exist, given the rising number of non-tariff trade 
barriers and protectionist policies. Disruptions in the global supply chains 
have also exposed some of their vulnerabilities and of global trade itself. 
(Armelius, Belfrage & Stenbacka 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2015a, 212, 242).  
In a period when business capital investments could have been possible due to 
the low financing costs caused by post-crisis supportive monetary policies, 
many firms in developed countries have not been able to realize capital 
investments, since constraints in credit supply have increased the real user 
cost of capital. Hence, global capital investments that had first shifted from the 
developed to emerging market economies have since 2014 been halting in 
several emerging economies as well. (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2015a, 214-238.)  
Technical breakthroughs, non-technical innovation and service sector 
innovation have been suggested as drivers for economic growth (European 
Commission, 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2015b). However, since 2013, both global public and private 
R&D expenditure has been stagnant or is even decreasing. What is more 
significant is that the reduction in total R&D expenditure is the highest in 
developed countries, which could further diminish hopes for a global 
economic growth. (Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO 2014; European 
Commission 2014.) 
In the case of technology firms, the emergence of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), 
referring to global networks of smart connected products, and its industrial 
counterpart, the Industrial Internet, are expected to radically change the 
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traditional forces of competition. This is a change that might push many 
industrial companies to adopt new business models and revise their value 
chains. (Porter & Heppelmann 2014; 2015.) Nevertheless, many enterprises 
are hesitating to fully embrace these new opportunities, often because of – 
again – uncertainty. Many of these new opportunities require additional R&D 
expenditure while such policy is being avoided for reasons explained earlier. 
Secondly, many of the new technologies or business models are challenging 
conventional and conservative legislative boundaries, presenting risks for first 
mover companies. Governments have only recently started to create national 
and transnational policies for the commercial exploitation of these new 
technologies and business models. In several cases, however, local 
governments are still responding with protectionist policies, as they consider 
these new forms of competition as threats to the existing businesses. 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015b, European 
Commission 2015.) 
Given this multitude of changes in the current business environment, the next 
question is what more enterprises can expect in the future. Rekettye & 
Rekettye (2013) identify six major global trends that present a high possibility 
of effecting business performance during the near future, as shown in Figure 1. 
The nature of these global trends is such that they will continue to alter 
business environments in the next decennia. Moreover, these trends are not 
separate phenomena but are closely interlinked, making it even more 
challenging for enterprises to find and formulate adequate business models 
that can deal with their combined effect. (ibid., 108.) 
All these changes have also an impact on one of the main stakeholders of the 
industrial enterprise, namely the customer–often an industrial firm itself–who 
has been confronted with and affected by similar changes in the environment. 
To offset the persistent uncertainty in the environment, customers start 
searching for products and solutions that can offer them tangible elements of 
certainty such as reliability, value for money, durability, safety and close 
support. This again, opens opportunities for enterprises that can efficiently 
respond to these changing customer needs. (Simon 2009.) 
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Figure 1. Six global trends with a high likelihood of influencing business 
performance (Rekettye & Rekettye 2013, 97) 
As firms’ environment–and with it the nature of competition–changes, firms 
need to initiate strategic change in order to re-align their strategy with 
changing conditions (Huff, Huff & Thomas 1992). Through strategic change a 
firm aims to redefine the ways in which it competes (Covin & Miles 1999) and 
thus to secure its long-term growth or development. The critical task for the 
firm’s executive management is to match organizational competences with the 
opportunities and risk created by environmental changes, in an effective and 
efficient way. Turbulence in the global business environment has occurred in 
the past, arguably on different scales, and plenty of examples can be found of 
companies that managed to use changing environments to their advantage 
through the deployment of the right strategic practices by its managers 
(Vecchiato 2105). As a matter of fact, the role of managers as the drivers of 
enterprises and, consequently, macro-economic growth through the decisions 
they make is often overlooked by economic theory, although its importance in 
explaining the difference between successful and unsuccessful enterprises and 
economies is beyond doubt (Augier & Teece 2009).  
1.1.2 Management in need for research that supports the everyday 
practice of strategy making 
Given the plenitude of changes in the global business environment, there is an 
obvious need for firms to adapt their strategies to cope with these changes. 
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The primary question that is left open for many executives is, however, how to 
develop an adequate strategy in practice. One possible option is to involve 
external strategy consultants. Although the growth of the global multibillion 
dollar consultancy industry indicates that plenty of firms consider this option 
(The Economist 2013), literature does not give clear indications that hiring 
strategy consultants would positively contribute to a firm’s strategy 
development. Ginsberg (1989) suggests that strategy consultants act mainly as 
change agents, and that they are more likely to focus on facilitating better 
strategic response to the firm’s environment, but that any causal relationship 
between the consultants’ influence and the firms’ organizational performance 
remains to be proven. Another aspect to consider is how executives perceive 
the involvement of consultants during strategy development processes. Harste 
and Richter (2008) find that managers may appreciate the support of 
consultants in strategy projects to various degrees, but suggest that, 
ultimately, managers prefer to assume the leading role in strategic initiatives 
and want to take ownership of the strategy development. In this regard, 
Bowman (1995, 5) uses the term “consultants’ strategy” (emphasis added) to 
refer to a strategy that may be of high quality content, but that is not “owned” 
by the executive team members, who consequently might feel less committed 
to accepting and implementing it.  
The second, obviously preferred, option for strategy development is thus 
making it the exclusive task of the top management team, without external 
(consultancy) support. The question that then remains is how a top 
management team can develop a strategy in practice. 
Strategy scholars have suggested a wide variety of frameworks for strategy 
development. Nevertheless, much of the strategy research focuses by nature 
on isolated aspects of strategic development in a particular context, for 
instance on approaches for achieving competitive strategies (e.g. Porter 1979, 
Barney 1986, Prahalad & Hamel 1990) or on the nature of strategy 
development processes (e.g. Chandler 1970; Cyert & March 1992; Ansoff 1987; 
Pettigrew 1978; Mintzberg 1979, 1985; Burgelman 1983, 1988). Similarly, only 
a limited array of strategy process perspectives receives attention in strategy 
textbooks, and either focus on rational decision making processes used as 
benchmark for management or, alternatively, provide a descriptive 
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understanding of the process (Sminia 2009, 98). Some scholars have asked 
whether all these established strategy frameworks can still be applied in 
today’s highly volatile environment. Moreover, they argue that practising 
strategists require up-to-date and contemporary strategic management 
practices, since practices that were developed in a more stable world might 
have lost some of their validity (Grant 2007; Polowczyk 2012).   
Even highly-educated managers and executives might be reluctant to accept 
academic research findings as relevant and useful in everyday, practical, 
settings (Bolton & Stolcis 2003). Management theory is often built upon a 
framework of scientific rationality, which, despite its validity, might fail to 
provide insights that have relevant practical value for practitioners. An 
alternative for avoiding this disconnection between theory and practice is 
conducting research that builds on frameworks of practical rationality. This 
means frameworks in which researchers theorize through close engagement 
with practitioners and study of the practices they employ, as well as the drivers 
for using these practices and the outcomes to which practices lead. (Sandberg 
& Tsoukas 2011.) 
One can reasonably assume that for an executive manager, strategy 
development is a matter of “doing”, a matter of performing a certain set of 
activities within an organizational context to formulate the most adequate 
strategy for that same organization. This perspective is strongly supported by 
the “strategy-as-practice” framework, a stream of research that gained 
importance in the last decennium and that focuses on the praxis of strategizing 
through leaders and their organizations. (Jarzabkowski 2003; Rasche & Chia 
2008; Vaara & Whittington 2012.) The fact that strategy-as-practice aims to 
study strategy “together with strategists, for strategists” makes it a very 
valuable framework for studying the challenges of the strategizing executives. 
It also provides them with more useful insight, more effective methods and 
more efficient tools to formulate the most suitable strategy for their firm.  
While established top management teams may have developed a common way 
of strategizing during years of practice and collaboration, the challenges of 
conducting successful strategy development are much higher for newly 
appointed top management teams. This is a condition that is often 
encountered by high-growth SMEs, which may need to adopt more active 
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strategies and set up more formal organizational structures in order to sustain 
their growth (Smallbone, Leig & North 1995, 59-60). Nevertheless, research 
indicates that SMEs often fail in the formulation of adequate long-term 
strategies, because they tend to lack a proper approach for strategy 
development and because of the inability to systematically benchmark their 
competiveness versus industry competitors (Singh, Garg, & Deshmukh 2008, 
539). Moreover, SMEs appear to have a limited understanding of the markets 
they operate, which can be reflected in the formulation of unrealistic business 
strategies (Frizelle 2001, 133). 
One can imagine that for newly appointed top management teams the practice 
of strategy development can be challenging since team members have not yet 
developed specific routines, often have very diverse experience levels in terms 
of strategic management capabilities, and may have divergent opinions about 
the optimal direction of the firm. Understanding the dynamics of strategy 
development by newly appointed to management teams and of the effect of 
their strategizing practices on the strategy they formulate has, however, 
received few attention in extant strategy research. 
1.2 Motivation of the research 
The goal of this study is twofold. The first goal is to deepen the understanding 
about how members of a newly appointed top management team develop a 
new strategy for their firm, about the practices they employ to form a strategy 
in a real-life setting, and how these practices affect the quality of the resulting 
strategy. The findings of this study can contribute to the strategy-as-practice 
research, a field that is still in need of more empirical studies (Jarzabkowski & 
Spree 2009; Healey, Hodgkinson, Whittington & Johnson 2015; Jarzabkowski 
& Kaplan 2015).  
Furthermore, strategy research should strive to support the strategy 
profession by providing practicing strategists with new, up-to-date knowledge 
about how to develop strategy in different contexts (Whittington, Cailluet & 
Yakis-Douglas 2011). The context of this study is strategy development by a 
newly appointed top management team. Although research has studied the 
relationship between top management team tenure and strategic change (e.g. 
Wiersema & Bantel 1992), there is still limited understanding of the 
mechanisms that drive this relationship.  
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The second goal of this thesis is to provide strategizing executives with 
practical guidance for future strategy development initiatives, especially in 
cases where the top management team tenure is short. As mentioned earlier, 
this is a common case in high-growth SMEs, which are often forced to engage 
in more formal strategy management processes to plan their future. The 
process of strategy development depends a lot on cognitive processes such as 
obtaining knowledge, reasoning, creating mental models, sense-making and 
socio-cultural processes such as communicating, co-operating, conflict-solving 
and accommodation. Eden (1992, 799) describes the strategic planning 
process as a “collusion (sic!) of the dispassionate and 'objective' activities of 
strategic analysis combined with those aspects of social science which reflect 
the passion of interaction in organizations”. This complex interplay makes 
strategic management research both fascinating and challenging. Although 
strategic management research scholars, for proper reasons, study many of the 
aspects of this interplay in isolation within the boundaries of various academic 
disciplines, a holistic, practice-based, approach that aims to study the various 
aspects of the strategy process continuum as they occur in a real-life setting 
can reveal valuable new insights about the genesis of corporate and business 
strategies for practicing managers. 
The personal reason why I embarked on this research journey was, no doubt, 
inspired by my interest in the field of strategy. During my career, I have 
worked for some of the world’s largest companies as well as for SME’s. Along 
the road, I became much fascinated by the question of how companies create 
the vision of their future and how they realize that vision. Understanding the 
making of strategy was central to answering these questions. When I decided 
to start studying business management, it was obvious that strategic 
management research would receive a lot of my attention. Soon after, I had 
the unique opportunity to be closely involved in a strategic renewal process, 
which gave me the chance to study how theory and praxis of strategic 
management come together in a real-life setting. 
1.3 Research questions 
As noted earlier, a strategy is commonly considered as an important 
management tool for enabling the enterprise’s future survival and success. The 
question is how a new or renewed strategy comes into existence. Developing a 
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strategy is the result of certain “practices”: a specific group of people, 
“strategists”, performing specific activities in a specific way. Certain practices 
in the formulation process might have a positive effect on the content–i.e. the 
various matters that the strategy addresses, and the way in which these 
matters are addressed–of the formulated strategy, while others might have a 
negative effect. In other words, there is a plausible relationship between the 
characteristics of the strategy formulation process and the characteristic 
features of the formulated strategy, what I call the “traits” of the strategy 
content. These traits determine the value of the strategy as a management tool 
for the company for which it is formulated.  
Well-established top management teams have usually developed expertise in 
and routines for strategy development. The situation is, however, very 
different for a newly appointed top management teams that is formed through 
the promotion of middle managers into senior management roles. Little is 
known about how such teams engage in strategy making, and how well they 
succeed in formulating effective strategies. Establishing a possible relationship 
between the strategy formulation practices of such newly appointed top 
management teams and the traits of the strategy they formulate is the main 
subject of this research.  
Although there is an undeniable relationship between strategy formulation 
and implementation, I have deliberately chosen to focus this study on strategy 
formulation. The reasons for this choice are twofold. Firstly, given the 
extensive nature of strategy process research, narrowing the study to the 
strategy formulation process will give it more depth. Secondly, as the 
formulation and implementation of a strategy may span a period of several 
months to even years, separating the study of both topics makes it possible to 
timely publish the research findings related to the formulation stage, which 
will be to the advantage of both the strategists–who can use the results to 
initiate specific follow-up activities–as the study of the strategy 
implementation, which can take better into account the findings of the 
strategy formulation process. 
The main research questions and the two sub-questions are defined as follows: 
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What is the relationship between the practices that a newly 
appointed top management team employs during strategy 
formulation and the traits of the formulated strategy? 
• RQ1a: Which practices can be distinguished during the strategy 
formulation process conducted by a newly appointed top management 
team? 
• RQ1b: What are the traits of the strategy content that is formulated by a 
newly appointed top management team? 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis starts with an introduction to the research topic and the definition 
of the research questions, which can be found in Chapter 1, followed by the 
literature review in Chapter 2. The literature review aims to give a 
comprehensive overview of the extant strategic management research that is 
deemed essential to support this study. The research methodology is explained 
in Chapter 3, and provides details about the design of the research and the 
data collection and analysis methods. The findings of the study are presented 
in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides the discussion of the results, the practical and 
theoretical contributions, the limitations of the study and the suggestions for 
further research. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Key concepts 
2.1.1 Strategy 
A firm’s strategy usually consists of a single corporate strategy and one or 
more business strategies. Corporate strategy is commonly considered as the 
management tool for matching a firm’s activities with the firm environment in 
order to sustain the firm’s performance (Hofer & Schendel 1978, 27; Bowman 
& Helfat 2001).  Corporate strategy is the firm’s comprehensive outline on its 
purpose and its objectives and on how it will achieve their realization over 
time. It defines the range of businesses the firm will pursue, its economic and 
non-economic objectives and how it intends to interact with its various 
internal and external stakeholders. Whereas corporate strategy applies to the 
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whole firm, business strategies refers to the competitive strategies of the firm’s 
constituent businesses, and describes their offerings and the way they will 
compete in specific market environments. (Andrews 1987, 13.)  
2.1.2 Strategy renewal 
In their research on corporate entrepreneurship, Covin and Miles (1999) use 
the term strategic renewal to refer to the “phenomenon whereby the 
organization seeks to redefine its relationships with its markets or industry 
competitors by fundamentally altering how it competes”, thus emphasizing 
that the primary focus of strategy renewal is on the interaction between the 
organization and its external environment. (52.) Agarwal and Helfat (2009, 
282) refer to strategic renewal as a process that presents opportunities and 
challenges. They define strategic renewal as a process that changes attributes 
of an organization with the potential of affecting its long-term prospects and 
distinguish between two types of strategic renewal, namely discontinuous 
transformation and continuous incremental transformation. Strategic 
transformation can be required to react to major changes in the firm 
environment and when traditional means for achieving growth are no longer 
valid. Incremental strategic renewal is a more pro-active response to changes 
in the environment as they occur, and may even allow the firm to influence its 
environment to its advantage. (ibid., 283-284.) 
Strategy scholars have identified a wide variety of both firm internal as 
external antecedents that may trigger strategic renewal activities. Changes in 
the firm external environment are a common trigger for initiating strategic 
change (Chandler 1970). In this respect, strategic change is the mechanism 
through which management tries to decrease uncertainty about the 
environment (Miles, Snow, Meyer & Coleman 1978, 547; Wernerfelt & Karnaki 
1987, 187; Mintzberg 1993, 32-33; Porter 1994, 443-444). Whereas in times of 
stability strategy can be adapted slowly and incrementally, often without 
explicit reformulation, strong disruptions in the environment can be a trigger 
for explicit strategic (re-)formulation, for instance in response to imminent 
market saturation, technological breakthroughs or rapidly increasing 
competition (Chandler 1970, 25) or to changing customer behaviour (Reynolds 
2006, 445). Internal antecedents for strategic change that have been identified 
are, for example, declining performance (Barker & Duhaime 1997, 30-32), 
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managerial dissatisfaction with the current strategy (Huff, Huff & Thomas 
1992, 55), an adequate management culture (Lorsch 1986, 95) and certain 
governance characteristics (Brunninge, Nordqvist & Wiklund 2007, 296; 
Napoli 2012, 232; Napoli 2014, 10983).  
In practice, however, strategic renewal initiatives are initiated by actors within 
the organization. The individuals that contribute to strategy development are 
not exclusively strategizing executives, but basically any individual in the 
organization who has access to strategically divergent information and who is 
responsive to new divergent ideas can initiate strategic change (Woolridge & 
Floyd, 1999). As such, middle management members (Floyd & Woolridge 
1997; Woolridge, Schmid & Floyd 2008; Raes, Heijltjes, Glunk & Roe 2011), 
board members (Judge & Zeithaml 1992; Rindova 1999; Nadler 2004; 
Fiegener 2005) and even actors external to the firm such as advisors and 
consultants (Whittington 2006, 624-626) can all play a role in driving 
strategic change.  
Not all strategy scholars consider strategic renewal as a distinct event in time. 
Mintzberg (1978) finds that both the firm’s internal and external context 
continuously drive strategic change and that strategy is the result of a 
permanent balancing act between three forces determined by: (1) a 
continuously changing environment in which high levels of instability are not 
uncommon (2) an ‘organizational operating system or bureaucracy’ that 
strives for stability, regardless what happens in the environment and (3) 
leadership who’s role is to balance the forces, by ensuring internal stability 
while adapting to external change. (941-943.) Similarly, Chakravarthy & White 
(2002) suggest that a firm’s performance, its context and its strategy are 
interrelated and in constant dynamic interaction, instead of being part of one-
directional cause-effect relationships. 
2.1.3 Strategy formulation 
Strategy formulation and implementation are often considered as two separate 
sub-processes of the strategy renewal process, although this viewpoint is not 
equivocally supported in strategic management research. 
Ansoff (1987) proposes a formal strategy renewal process that has a distinct 
formulation and implementation stage. The strategy formulation stage starts 
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with analysis, the outcome of which provides input for specifying the strategic 
areas in which the firm will operate and how it will operate in order to be 
competitive. (100-107.) Andrews (1987) takes a more in-depth approach to the 
strategy process than Ansoff, and argues that the process of strategy 
formulation is built on the ability to consider and reconcile four major 
elements, “(1) appraisal of present and foreseeable opportunity and risk in the 
company environment, (2) assessment of the firms unique combination of 
present and potential corporate resources or competences, (3) determination 
of noneconomic personal and organizational preferences to be satisfied and 
(4) identification and acceptance of the social responsibilities of the firm”. (77-
79.) Hofer & Schendel (1978, 5) emphasize as well the importance of a 
formalized strategy formulation process, which “should be managed and not 
left to chance”, although they propose a more complex process, not so much 
for the sake of complexity itself, - which they admit is not required in all 
circumstances – but because simple processes might not be sufficient in all 
situations.  
Mintzberg (1978), however, questions the intrinsically deliberate nature of the 
strategy processes. Consequently, Mintzberg (1985; 1990) dismisses formal 
strategy formation models that consist of a separate formulation and 
implementation stage as oversimplifications. Similarly, Huff, Huff and 
Thomas (1992) consider renewal efforts as an evolutionary process and 
emphasize its continuous character as opposed to explicit activities that are 
isolated in time. Albert, Kreuzer and Lechner (2015, 210) align with Mintzberg 
(1978; 1985; 1990) on the continuous process aspect of strategic renewal and 
refer to it as “the incremental process through which an organization 
continuously adapts to the environment and explores opportunities to invoke 
change in its activity choices and outputs”, thereby also indicating the need for 
changes in the company internal environment.  
2.2 Researching strategy processes 
Pettigrew (1987) states that “the starting point for [the] analysis of strategic 
change is the notion that formulating the content of any new strategy 
inevitably entails managing its context and process” (657). As shown in Figure 
2, Pettigrew considers strategy content, context and process as three 
interconnected analytical categories (ibid., 658).  
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Figure 2. Interconnected analytical categories in strategic change (adapted 
from Pettigrew 1987, 657) 
Process research looks into the “how” of strategic change (Pettigrew 1987, 
658). It studies the strategists–i.e. the behaviour of the actors in the strategy 
process–the issues they intend to solve and the sequence of actions in which 
they do so (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst 2006, 703). The process of change 
refers to the “actions, reaction and interactions of all interested parties as they 
seek to move the firm from its present to its future state” (Pettigrew 1987, 657-
658). Strategy content refers to “what” of strategic change, i.e. the specific 
areas that are being transformed in the change process (Pettigrew 1987, 658) 
and focuses for the most part on the outcome of the strategy process, that is, 
on the strategic decisions itself, and how well these decisions allow to achieve 
competitive advantage (Rasche 2008, 59). Strategy context is about the “why” 
of strategy (Pettigrew 1987, 658) and examines the array of circumstances that 
drive the various strategic decisions that are made in terms of strategy process 
and content.  
Pettigrew’s context-content-process categorisation is endorsed by several 
other scholars (e.g. Chakravarthy & Doz 1992; Ketchen, Thomas & McDaniel 
1996) who as well emphasize the interrelation between the process-content-
context aspects as the key driver of the firm’s strategic change and 
consequently the firm’s performance.  
Pettigrew (1992, 7) argues that despite the distinction between strategic 
process and content research, the analysis of strategic change should 
simultaneously explore “the links between context, content and process of 
change together with their interconnections through time”. Furthermore, in 
studies where the scope of the research is on processual analysis, the inclusion 
Content 
Context 
- Internal 
- External 
Process 
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of a temporal dimension is a prerequisite to capture the dynamics of a process 
(Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew, Woodman & Cameron 2001). Elaborating on 
Pettigrew, Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst (2006) propose a comprehensive 
framework for strategy process research literature review that integrates the 
temporal dimension of the various components of the strategy process and 
their relationships. As shown in Figure 3, Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst 
(2006) divide the strategy process research into three major categories: 
“antecedents”, “process” and “outcomes”.  
 
Figure 3. Components of the strategy process over time and their relations as 
subjects of strategy research (adapted from Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst 
2006, 678) 
Research related to the “antecedents” category focuses on the triggers for the 
strategy process, which can be located in the firm’s external environmental 
context, its internal context or in the context of its performance, both from an 
economic and non-economic perspective 
“Process”-related research looks at how the strategy process is conducted, 
determined by the actors of the process (the strategists) and the nature of the 
strategic issue(s) they intend to solve 
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Research about “outcomes” studies how the firm’s external and internal 
context and its performance have been impacted through the strategy process. 
Furthermore, given the importance of the relationships between antecedents, 
process and outcomes, Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst group the research 
about the relationships between the three categories into four classes (or 
“streams”) as depicted in Figure 4: (1) influence of antecedents on process, (2) 
influence of the process on the process itself, (3) influence of the process on 
outcomes, and (4) influence of the antecedents on outcomes. (676-678.)  
The literature review in this study will follow the framework proposed by 
Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst (2006), since it provides a logical and 
comprehensive structure for obtaining insight in strategy research and 
supports understanding the role of process research within the strategy 
research field. As the focus of this study is on the process and its outcome, the 
following literature review will focus on the two relationships that directly 
relate to the research question: 
• literature about the sub-processes within the strategy renewal process is 
reviewed in 2.2.1, 
• literature about the effect of strategy on organizational outcomes is 
reviewed in the chapter 2.2.2. 
 
Figure 4. Four major relationships R1…R4 that are studied in strategy 
research; Relations R2 and R3 are the subject of this research (adapted from 
Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst 2006, 678) 
22 
 
   
2.2.1 Influence of the process on the process itself 
Although one may be inclined to think about the strategy formulation process 
as a positivist, rational, linear cause-effect process, according Cofrancesco 
(2016, 242-243) strategy formulation is above all a complex social activity. 
Extant literature has indeed shown that a broad area of social and behavioural 
factors come into play during the strategy-making process, such as decision 
making (Cyert & March 1992; Helfat et al. 2007; Hodgkinson & Starbuck 
2012, 5-15), cognition and cognitive bias (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Porac & 
Thomas 2002; Das & Bing-Sheng 1999; Hodgkinson & Clarke 2007), intuition 
(Khatri & Ng 2000; Miller & Ireland 2005), emotions (Hess & Bacigalupo  
2011; Voronov & Weber 2016), power and politics (Lewis 2002) and 
sensemaking (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld 2005). 
Insight in the process of strategic decision making, which often happens 
against a background of uncertainty and ambiguity, is essential in 
understanding the way how strategies are being created. Helfat et al. (2007) 
emphasize that economic theory tends to “underplay[s] the role of the 
[strategic] manager[s]” while in fact they play a primordial role in overcoming 
flaws in the economic system through their strategic actions and decisions.  
Six classes of strategic-entrepreneurial decisions can be identified to ensure fit 
between the company and its environment: “(1) orchestrating co-specialized 
assets, (2) selecting organizational/governance modes and associated 
incentive systems, (3) designing business models, (4) nurturing change and 
innovation processes and routines, (5) making investment choices and (6) 
providing leadership, vision and motivation to employees”. A seventh class of 
decisions, “designing and implementing controls and basic operations”, are 
according Helfat et al. operational in nature and, although important, should 
not be the main focus of strategic management and strategic decision making. 
(20-22.)  
Knowing which strategic decisions are to be made is logically followed by the 
question which mechanisms drive these decisions.  Some scholars (e.g., Ansoff 
1987; Andrews 1987; Hofer & Schendel 1978) have proposed rational, rule-
based, processes for guiding the decision-making process during strategy 
development. Rational decision-making processes, however, are inherently 
based on the assumption that decision makers have access to complete and 
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accurate information, that they are able of correctly processing all 
information, that they can assess the most probable consequences of 
alternative actions and that they use consistent decision making schemes– 
assumptions that are rarely valid in practice (Hodkinson & Sparrow 2002, 8-
11; Hodgkinson & Starbuck 2012, 6).  
Cyert and March (1992, 30) state that organizations have no objectives – only 
individuals have – and that any objective is a negotiated consensus between 
participants. Furthermore, as noted earlier, participants in a supposedly 
rational decision making process commonly face limitations in the 
information on which they can base their decisions, a phenomenon Cyert and 
March coin by the term “bounded rationality”. As a result, participants in 
decision making process tend to simplify the decision process and may not try 
to find the best possible solution but instead prefer to fall back on familiar 
solutions. (ibid. 214- 215.) Das & Bing-Sheng (1999) suggest that the nature of 
the strategic decision making process mode is a determinant of the prevalent 
type(s) of cognitive bias in the process, and that bias can occur even though 
participants in the process strive towards rationality. Individual managerial 
background can be a determinant of the strategic choices taken. Each manager 
individually processes environmental and organizational inputs through 
different cognitive bases and value perceptions and his/her actual 
consideration and selection of strategic options is determined by specific 
mechanisms of perception and interpretation (Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
Therefore, a manager’s cognitive capacity to construct mental models may be 
better predictor for the direction of strategic change than common managerial 
characteristics (e.g. age, experience) and timely strategic change can only be 
achieved when managers possess the cognitive capacities for spotting 
environmental change, interpreting the observed stimuli and translating them 
into actions to be taken (Barr et al., 1992).  
The fact whether strategic decision making is improved by consensus or 
conflict between the top management team members has been subject of 
discussion in strategic management research. Top management team size 
tends to increase cognitive and affective conflict. While cognitive conflict 
between team members is positively related to higher quality strategic decision 
making, affective conflict can compromise the consensus that is required for 
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decision implementation. Affective conflict between top team members should 
be mitigated through openness and shared awareness about mutual interests. 
(Amason & Sapienza 1997, 511). Related to consensus is group cohesion, which 
is defined by Carron (1982) as a “group members’ inclinations to forge social 
bonds, resulting in members sticking together and remaining united”. 
Although the relationship between group cohesion and performance has 
received wide attention in research, the nature of this relationship is found to 
be complex and ambiguous. (Casey-Campbell & Martens 2008, 224-227.). 
Tuckman’s (Tuckman 1965; Tuckman & Jensen 1977) conceptual model of the 
formation sequences of small groups identifies the development of group 
cohesion as one of the evolutionary stages of any new group.  
Strategic decision making can be also influenced by intuition, which is not a 
synonym for guessing nor opposite to rationality but instead is a sophisticated, 
unbiased, partly unconscious form of reasoning that draws on specific degrees 
of experience. Empirical data suggest that the use of intuition in strategic 
decision making is more suitable in highly unstable contexts than in stable 
environments. (Khatri & Ng 2000.). The use of intuition can even have 
benefits in explorative situations - for example when conceiving strategic or 
technological alternatives – but should be complemented by more analytical 
methods (Miller & Ireland 2005). The interplay of rationality and intuition in 
strategic decision making is studied by Hodgkinson & Clarke (2007) who 
distinguish four cognitive styles along analytical-intuitive dimensions of 
information processing, which in turn influence the strategic decision making 
process. Certain activities in the strategy process may conflict with the 
cognitive style of the strategist and therefore strategy praxis should be 
matched with the cognitive styles of individual participants. Hodgkinson & 
Clarke, however, admit that the way in which such can be achieved in a real 
life setting is yet to be explored.  
Recently, increasing attention has been given to the role of emotions in 
decision making processes. Loewenstein (2003) distinguishes between 
expected and immediate emotions, the latter indirectly influencing decision 
making because of its altering effect on perceptions of reality, information 
processing and even behaviour. Hess & Bacigalupo (2011) state that the 
application of emotional intelligence skills can help decision makers in dealing 
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with emotions since such skills support the decision making process and 
enhance the process outcomes.Voronov & Weber (2016) acknowledge the role 
of emotions in organizational settings and propose the concept of emotional 
competence, which unlike emotional intelligence is not an individual’s 
capability for social interaction but rather is linked to “specific actor roles 
within a particular institutional order” (457). Related to emotions is the 
concept of affect, which Parkinson (1995) defines as the combination of 
emotions - feelings related to specific events, persons or objects - and mood - 
feelings unrelated to specific events, persons or objects – and can affect 
cognitive processes (Daniels 2012, 325).  For instance, individuals who 
experience positive affect – i.e. who are ‘in a good mood’ - may overemphasize 
the likelihood of positive outcomes for instance and are more willing to accept 
heuristic information processing since they see the environments as more 
benign compared to individuals who experience negative affect and therefore 
see the environment more as problematic (ibid., 330-331). 
Shifting the focus from the individual manager to the management team as an 
entity, Ansoff (1987) observes that management’s lack in strategic thinking 
capability is a constraint in many firms because most management teams will 
tend to focus on operative and administrative decisions while neglecting or 
postponing the strategic decision making unless a certain event pushes them 
to do so. This was also confirmed during by Eisenhardt (1989) who, based on a 
study in the microcomputer industry, proposed a model to explain differences 
in the speed of strategic decision making process in environments where 
information is scarce or inaccurate.  
Miller et al. (1998) study the relationship between strategic decision making 
and cognitive diversity – i.e. the “variation in beliefs concerning cause–effect 
relationships and variation in preferences concerning various goals for the 
organization” (Miller, 1990) – and conclude that high cognitive diversity 
between executives may, contra-intuitively, have a negative impact on their 
ability for strategic decision making as it tends to cause problems of 
communication, integration and political behaviour. In a similar line of 
thought, Gallén (2008)–building on Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic 
topologies–argues, based on a study of executives in the spa industry, that 
cognitive composition of the TMT affects the strategy they prefer, with 
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intuitive-thinking TMTs being more inclined towards prospector/analyser 
strategies, while sensing-thinking TMTs rather seek defender/analyser 
strategies.  
Also, the way in which (strategic) decision problems are presented to a team 
can create bias in the decision makers’ judgements. When the benefits of a 
specific alternative are highlighted, decision makers tend to take a negative, 
risk-avoiding, stance toward that alternative, and vice-versa. Therefore, to 
reduce bias in strategic decision making, strategists should go through a 
process of reflection prior to selecting strategic alternatives. (Hodgkinson, 
Bown, Maule, Glaister & Pearman 1999, 983.) Meissner (2014, 117) argues that 
the decision quality in the strategy process can improve when participants are 
exposed to cognitive conflict that is stimulated through information 
integration and alternative generation, two practices that need to be planned 
for during the strategy process design. On the other hand, Gibson (2001, 130) 
argues groups should maintain an equilibrium between conflict and consensus 
because higher intragroup consensus tends to facilitate knowledge integration 
and thus decision making while higher levels of intragroup conflict may 
stimulate knowledge exploration and examination. 
Despite the fact that the notions of power and politics have a negative 
connotation in most Western organizations, Lewis (2002, 28) find that the use 
of power and politics – the latter being “the things people engage in when 
power does not come naturally” (Pfeffer 1981) – in strategic change processes 
should not be de facto dismissed and argues that in certain circumstances they 
might even be the only way to overcome resistance to change, for instance 
when organizational structures disproportionally favour certain groups or 
individuals to the disadvantage of others.  
Weick et al. (2005) propose the concept of sensemaking within organizations, 
which they define as “the process in which retrospective interpretations are 
built during interdependent interaction”. Sensemaking is a way of creating 
order in a context of flux, and comes into play when interdependent actors try 
to give meaning to ambiguous inputs and opt to settle for plausibility. (413.) 
The reason to look for and accept plausible explanations rather than accurate 
explanations is that the former allows people to move on, while the latter may 
cause undesirable standstill (ibid., 415). 
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Cognition has also been related to the interpretation of competition. Several 
studies have shown that strategists tend to perceive their own firm as 
representative of their industry. Furthermore, since strategists within a field 
or industry are often exposed to the same cues and face the similar issues, 
beliefs about how business is done within an industry may start to converge, 
ultimately leading to imitating behaviour between firms, as strategists of 
individual firms narrow down the amount of strategic options they consider 
feasible in their industry. (Hodgkinson & Sparrow 2002, 128-136.).  
Related to cognition is the aspect of learning, and several scholar link learning 
to strategy development processes. Burgelman (1988) sees strategy making as 
a social learning process within the organization, a process that requires 
certain mechanisms for top level managers to build further upon learnings 
from operative and middle levels in the organization. In line with Cyert and 
March (1963), Mintzberg (1990), however, questions the assumption that a 
single executive or a centralized body of authority within the organization can 
have access to all information needed for strategy formulation or–in the event 
it could have such access–would have the ability and time to convert all 
available information into knowledge of the firm’s internal and external 
environment upon which to base a strategy. Instead, Mintzberg (1990, 1993) 
emphasizes the element of learning in the strategy development process, 
especially in situations of substantial change and uncertainty. Gray and 
Gonsalves (2002) see learning activities in SMEs in parallel to strategic 
planning as a determinant of business success. Levinthal and March (1993), 
however, warn that the benefits of learning in strategic renewal processes 
should not be overestimated, since learning rather provides knowledge about 
the short-term while strategy is about focusing on the long-term. Furthermore, 
they argue that learning tends to focus on the learner’s close environment and 
that there is a bias toward learning from success rather than learning from 
failure.  
National and organizational culture may also have an impact on (strategic) 
decision making. Myers, Kakabadse, McMahon and Spony (1995) suggest that 
top managements’ management styles vary with national culture of the TMT 
members. For example, Swedish and Finnish top management teams appear 
to emphasize team spirit and consensual decision making (ibid., 21). 
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Shrivastava (1985) finds that strategy formulation can be influenced by 
organizational culture as well, and finds that four groups of cultural elements 
have a distinct impact on various stages of the strategic decision making 
process: (1) myths and sagas affect problem formulation, (2) language systems 
and metaphors affect the generation of strategic alternatives, (3) symbolism, 
ceremony and rituals affect consensual understanding and (4) value systems 
and behavioural norms affect strategic choice. Consequently, organizational 
culture also influences strategic content. (104.) 
A next topic that is addressed by strategy research is which specific actors are 
involved in the process, their role and influence, and how they interact either 
as individuals or as groups during strategy formation.  
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are mostly judged on how well they guide the 
firm to future success through strategic conceptualizations rather than on how 
well they can maintain present conditions (Bass 2007). Strategically oriented 
CEOs “focus on what comes next and make it happen”. (ibid., 40). Based on 
his review of strategic leadership research, Bass suggest that the ability for 
strategic formulation is much determined by the strategic leadership qualities 
of its executives’, i.e. their capability to look into the future, scan the firm’s 
environment and – despite lack or overflow of information – translate the 
resulting observations into visions, strategies, processes, structures, and 
organisational culture, while sustaining constructive intra- and extra-
organizational dialogues. A core competence for CEOs and executives is the 
conceptual capacity to deal with issues of cognitive, behavioural and social 
complexities. (ibid., 40-41.) Korbi (2015) concurs with Bass on the core 
elements of strategic leadership, namely the capability to articulate a 
“powerful strategic vision and translate it into a realistic competitive strategy”, 
creativity and flexibility and communication, negotiating and influencing 
skills. According Korbi there is little evidence for supporting a single optimal 
strategic leadership style. Instead various styles of strategic leadership may be 
required during the strategic change process, depending on the circumstances. 
(20-22.) Research about European leadership styles by Brodbeck et al. (2000) 
pointed out that the presence and acceptance of certain leadership styles can 
depend on local and national cultural origins. Based on an empirical study, 
Carmeli et al. (2011) found that CEO relational leadership supports trust 
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building amongst TMT members, thereby helping them to learn from failures 
and thus improve strategic decision making. 
Rindova (1999) argues that directors of the board can make a significant 
contribution on strategic decision making by applying their problem-solving 
expertise. Such would, however, first require a more active dialogue between 
executives and directors during the strategy formation process. Based on a 
study of small corporations, Fiegener (2005), however, concluded that formal 
board participation in strategic matters is limited, with CEOs usually seeking 
advice of their boards only when they are facing organizational change or 
decreasing company performance. According Nadler (2004) CEOs should 
nevertheless seek active board involvement during corporate strategy 
development even though CEOs may be reluctant to involving the board too 
much in the actual managing of the firm.  
Woolridge et al. (2008) argue that strategy literature provides ample proof 
that middle management members play a considerable role in strategy 
development. Over the last decennia, the role of the middle management has 
evolved from plainly executing strategy to providing input (e.g. information) 
for strategy. Floyd and Woolridge (1997) stress that, to be of strategic value, 
the upward influence by middle managers should include a synthesis of 
strategically important information and should not be mere reporting about 
functional matters. Based on a case study, Canales finds that (2013) 
involvement of the middle management in top-driven strategy renewal 
becomes more important when such renewal is critical for survival of the 
organization. Involving the middle management should, however, not happen 
on an ad hoc basis. Instead, top management needs to plan in advance how the 
middle management will contribute to strategic renewal processes and then 
coach middle managers in getting acquainted with this role through 
transformational leadership. Floyd & Lane (2000) argue that roles conflicts 
between individual managers or between managerial functions might hinder 
the realization of change that is required for the strategic renewal process. 
These conflicts are mostly contained to middle and lower management 
echelons, but the manifestations of these conflicts, such as poor information 
exchanges and lack of trust, can nonetheless have repercussions on the 
interactions of executive management members. Raes et al. (2011) emphasize 
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as well the importance of good interface processes between executive and 
middle management teams as this can improve the quality of both strategic 
decision making and strategy implementation.  
Despite the apparent advantages of involving various organizational actors in 
the strategy process, not all organizations are per definition promoting 
participation. For instance, based on an empirical study of strategy work in 12 
organizations, Mantere and Vaara (2008, 356) find that certain conceptions of 
strategy that exist in organizations may in fact hinder participation in the 
strategy process. 
Tenure -.i.e. the period an individual or a specific group of individuals has 
spent in a certain organization – can be a significant demographic to explain 
organizational outcomes, although individual tenure is likely to have less 
impact than group tenure (Pfeffer 1985). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) 
studied the relationship between top management team member tenure on 
organizational outcomes in a sample of 100 firms across three industries. 
Their findings suggest that long-tenure top management teams are less 
inclined towards strategic change and experimentation and are more prone to 
mirroring the strategic directions that are common in their industries in 
comparison to short-tenure top management teams who are more engaged in 
strategic experimentation and willing to implement strategies that deviate 
from the common standard in their industry. The impact that newcomers to 
the TMT have on the strategic direction should not be exaggerated since it is 
the combined effect of the tenures of all top management team members that 
determines the strategic direction (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990). 
In their study of the impact of demographics on corporate strategic change, 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) distinguish between top management team 
demographic traits and demographic heterogeneity, the former being the level 
of individual demographic variables – e.g. age, tenure - and the latter the in-
group level of variance of these variables, as a measure for homogeneity or 
heterogeneity. In a study of top management teams of Fortune 500 firms, the 
amount of strategic change appears to be more explicit when average top 
management team tenure is higher (ibid., 113). One explanation for this 
correlation might be that longer tenure teams have more time to develop a 
common way of efficiently making strategy. Somehow opposite to Pfeffer 
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(1985) and Finkelstein & Hambrick (1990), the impact of individuals was 
found to be significant, since short tenure teams were more able to drive 
strategic change after outsiders had joined the top management team 
(Wiersema & Bantel 1992). From a more general group behavioural 
perspective, Gersick’s (1988) study about the work processes of newly formed 
teams finds, when facing time pressure, such teams tend to adopt specific 
routines to ensure they can complete the tasks they have been given. 
2.2.2 Influence of the strategy process on outcomes 
Achieving and sustaining competitive advantage is an often mentioned 
objective for strategic renewal, although scholars have different viewpoints 
about the focal point of the strategy renewal in order to reach this objective, 
for instance, through defining the optimal product-market position within the 
industry (Porter 1979, 1994), development and employment of specific 
internal competitive resources (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986; 
Barney 1991), streamlining the activities of the firm and establishing the right 
mindsets (Woolridge & Floyd 1999), redefining relationships with its markets 
or industry competitors (Covin & Miles 1999), and development of specific 
capabilities to adapt to the environment and influence the environment to the 
firm’s advantage (Prahalad & Hamel 1990; Teece & Pisano 1994; Teece, Pisano 
& Shuen 1997). 
While the focus of strategy is frequently directed to achieving economic goals, 
some scholars emphasize the non-economic goals of strategy, which make the 
strategy “human” (Andrews 1989), make it the stabilizing factor of the 
organization within the complexity of the business environment (Hendry & 
Seidl 2003), and can enhance strategic integration within the organization 
(Jarzabkowski & Balogun 2009). Positive non-economic outcomes may in turn 
enhance economic outcomes (Iaquinto & Fredrickson, 1997), for instance 
through defining a valued corporate purpose for the firm (Gartenberg, Prat & 
Serafeim 2016).  
2.3 Theoretical framework 
2.3.1 Strategy-as-Practice 
The “Strategy-as-practice” (S-a-P) framework takes the social practices that 
come into play during the making of strategy in organizations as a starting 
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point for strategy process research (Rasche & Chia 2009, 713). From a broader 
epistemological perspective, the emergence of the Strategy-as-Practice 
perspective fits in a renewed interest in the study of practices, reaching out to 
the field of sociology and organizational studies (Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks 
& Yanow 2009, 1310-1312). Strategy-as-practice deconstructs the traditional 
views of strategy context (considering the environment as determinant), 
strategy process (the macro-level organizational streams and process) and 
strategy content (the listing of rules and resources) and instead suggests these 
are three connected aspects which are constantly being recreated through 
social practices of the members of the organization (Rasche 2008, 272-273). 
Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009) explain the growth of the strategy-as-practice 
perspective because of a dissatisfaction with conventional strategy research 
which has neglected the importance of “human actors and their actions”. 
Instead, strategy as practice is concerned “with the doing of strategy: who does 
it, what they do, how they do it, what they use, and what implications this has 
for shaping strategy” (ibid., 69).  
Vaara and Whittington (2012, 290-291) identify four distinct features of 
strategy-as-practice research: strategy-as-practice research is based upon 
sociological theories of practices rather than upon economic theories, it 
considers multiple outcomes of strategy making which reach beyond the 
purely economical, it can be applied for studying strategic management in 
different types of organizations and it has caused a shift from quantitative 
towards qualitative methodologies. 
Chia and MacKay (2007) emphasize that although both the traditional 
processual framework and the strategy-as-practice framework seek to study 
the strategy process, they differ fundamentally from an ontological point of 
view. Whereas in processual research the ontological primacy is on the actor 
(and thus assumes that processes are the result of the actors’ deliberate 
intentions), the ontological primacy in the strategy-as-practice perspective is 
the practice in se, instead of individual or organizational intentions. According 
Chia and MacKay, to understand the emergence of a strategy, research should 
be sensitive for the “unspoken, the inarticulate and even the unconscious 
aspects of strategy making” which are expressed in strategic practices. 
Strategy-as-practice research should set itself clearly apart from processual 
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strategy research through rigorous focus on strategy practices as the primary 
locus of analysis. (ibid., 237-238).  
Denis, Langley and Rouleau (2007) argue in favour of using the strategy-as-
practice framework for strategizing in pluralistic organizations, i.e. 
organizations that are characterized by multiple objectives, diffuse power and 
knowledge-based work processes (182). Strategy-as-practice considers the act 
of strategy formulation and implementation as a social process, through the 
continuous discourse and communication between various members of the 
organization on and between all hierarchical levels. Emphasis is placed on the 
actual practice aspect of strategy development, the “way people talk, act and 
interpret when they are strategizing”. (ibid., 197.)  The practice of strategy 
formulation and implementation – often referred to by the term “strategizing” 
– draws on organizational and other practices which influence the way the 
strategy is formed and the resulting strategy itself (Vaara and Whittington 
2012, 286).  
Not only management research but also management education can benefit of 
an epistemology of practice, since it unites theory and practice, with theorists 
and practitioners working side by side to produce and disseminate new 
knowledge “with the ability to make modifications as knowledge is applied in 
practice or as new knowledge or theory is produced from the field” (Raelin 
2007, 499). From an educational point of view, the strategy-as-practice 
approach can provide the student with valuable insights about the strategy 
from a practitioner perspective, as an addition to in-class acquired knowledge 
(Harrington & Kearney 2011), and make the researcher-student familiar with 
the actual praxis of strategic management ,which may support the student in 
becoming a practitioner him/herself (Jarzabkowski & Whittington 2008). 
2.3.2 Practitioners, praxis and practices 
Whittington (2006) proposes an integrative framework for researching 
strategy formation aiming at the study of the three core elements that are 
involved in strategy formation – praxis, practices and practitioners – and 
emphasizes the importance of their interconnectedness and linkage between 
intra-organizational and extra-organizational levels. In Whittington’s 
framework, the concepts of praxis, practices and practitioners are defined as 
follows (ibid., 619-620): 
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• Strategy practitioners are the key actors “who do the work of making, 
shaping and executing strategies”. The group of strategy practitioners is 
not just limited to the strategizing executives, but includes all intra- and 
extra-organizational actors that play a role in the strategy work. 
• Strategy praxis is what the practitioners actually do, i.e. all the intra-
organizational, formal and informal activities that are performed during 
strategy formation and implement. Much of these activities happen 
during strategic praxis episodes, e.g. formal meetings, workshops, but 
also simple, informal conversations. 
• Strategy practices refer to how practitioners perform praxis. Practices 
are driven by intra-organizational, multilevel routines, procedures and 
cultures but also by extra-organizational – for instance sectoral and 
societal – routines and behaviours, for example industry-specific analysis 
techniques and societal norms. 
According Whittington, practice-oriented studies do not have to combine the 
three elements of praxis, practices and practitioners per definition, but given 
the interconnectedness between the three elements, the proposed research 
framework should reflect and acknowledge the links between these elements 
(ibid., 620). Balogun et al. (2012, 245) as well admit that keeping a 
simultaneous focus on the three aspects of the practices-practitioner-praxis 
framework may prove difficult during research, but add that the practitioner is 
probably the least well understood and thus should deserve particular 
attention. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Research approach 
The research approach defines the appropriate method(s) for answering the 
research question. As described in  1.3 the main research questions (RQ) and 
the two sub-questions (RQ1a and RQ1b) are: 
RQ: What is the relationship between the practices that a newly appointed 
top management team employs during strategy formulation and the traits of 
the formulated strategy? 
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• RQ1a: Which practices can be distinguished during the strategy 
formulation process conducted by a newly appointed top management 
team? 
• RQ1b: What are the traits of the strategy content that is formulated by a 
newly appointed top management team? 
The central theme of the research question are the practices of strategizing. As 
explained in 2.3, the strategy-as-practice framework focuses in particular on 
the study of strategizing practices and their relationship to a broad range of 
outcomes, and can thus be considered as suitable to answering the research 
question. Research according the strategy-as-practice framework is mostly 
qualitative in nature, but does not draw upon a single epistemological position 
or research strategy (Johnson, Langley, Melin & Whittington 2007, 53). 
Furthermore, strategy-as-practice-based research strives towards plurality in 
levels of analysis and their interrelationship, plurality of actors involved in 
strategizing across organizational levels, plurality of dependent variables and 
plurality of theories, employing multiple theoretical lenses (ibid. 12-15). 
As indicated by sub-question RQ1a, this research aimed to study the 
strategizing phenomena from a process viewpoint, which requires that the 
chosen research design is suitable to capture the temporal dynamics of the 
process, making longitudinal data collection a necessity (Johnson et al. 2007, 
53, 56). Furthermore, to study practices, the researcher needs to be in close 
proximity of the practicing strategists. 
For the above-mentioned reasons, ethnography was used as research method. 
Ethnography is one of the favored methods when the focus is on capturing the 
process aspect of strategizing, because it ensures proximity of the researcher 
to practicing strategists (Johnson et al. 2007, 56; Rouleau 2013, 559). Since 
the study intensively focused on a single case, framed within the context of the 
case company, it is an ethnographic case study (Bryman & Bell 2007, 68). 
Ethnography as research method assumes that researchers “first discover what 
people actually do and the reasons they give for doing it” before trying to 
provide interpretations based on own experience or on academic theories 
(LeCompte & Schensul 2010, 2). An important characteristic of ethnography 
as a form of scientific inquiry is that it intends to produce a story about events 
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as they occur in their natural setting, by documenting what is happening, 
without manipulating the setting (ibid., 13). Ethnography is suitable for the 
documentation of processes that are context dependent and where long-term 
presence in the setting to be observed is feasible. (ibid., 44-50). This condition 
is fulfilled in this study, since the researcher was allowed to work in the 
premises of the case company for the duration of the research. Furthermore, 
the researcher was granted access to all documents, databases and events (e.g. 
workshops, meetings) that were related to the subject of the research.  
Two of the most essential data-collection methods for ethnographic research 
are participatory observations and face-to-face interviews (LeCompte & 
Schensul 2010, 175-176), and both can be combined in the study of strategic 
practices (Bispo 2015, 316). Real-time observations are the primary data 
collection method because they allow to register the interactions between 
strategizing individuals, and thus can play an important role in “advancing the 
understanding of strategizing” while interviews are a good way to complement 
observations by providing data about how individuals feel about the events 
that occurred and to triangulate data. (Johnson et al. 2007, 68; Bispo 2015, 
316.). Another reason to take observations as primary data collection method 
is that they allow to witness the discursive practices that are core to strategy 
formation, since it is “through talking that strategists negotiate and establish 
meanings, express cognition, articulate their perceptions of the 
environment…and from this basis, legitimate their individual and collective 
judgements” (Samra-Fredericks 2003, 143).  
For these reasons, participatory observation complemented with face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews were used as data collection methods to answer 
RQ1a, “Which are the practices that members of newly appointed 
management teams apply in a strategy renewal process?”. 
In terms of unit of analysis, Johnson et al. (2007) point out that from a 
strategy-as-practice perspective the unit of analysis can be either very narrow 
or very broad, depending on where one wants to draw the boundaries of the 
activities that may contribute to strategizing and which activities need to be 
considered to answer the research question. To avoid ambiguity, however, it is 
recommended to avoid a too broad unit of analysis. Johnson et al. suggest that 
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an “attractive unit of analysis” for strategy-as-practice-based research is the 
“strategic episode” that is proposed by Hendry & Seidl (2003). (ibid., 58.) 
Hendry and Seidl (2003) draw upon Luhmann’s (1990, 2000) research on 
social systems to define the concept of “strategic episodes” as distinct events in 
time and place, during which the context switches from the operational 
towards the strategic context, and back once the episode is terminated. 
Examples of formal strategic episodes are meetings, workshops, away-days but 
also informal episodes such as casual discussions about strategic issues may be 
considered. (183-187.) 
From a practical perspective, it was unlikely that capturing all strategic 
episodes, both formal and informal, would be possible in this study. For this 
reason, the formal strategy episode was taken as unit of analysis, with an 
emphasis on the praxis aspect, namely “the flow of activities such as meeting, 
talking, calculating, form-filling and presenting in which strategy is 
constituted” (Jarzabkowksi & Whittington 2008, 283) At the onset of the 
strategy formulation process in the case company, it was decided to split the 
process in four consecutive praxis stages: the “briefing”, “analysis”, 
“prototyping” and “formulation” stages. Each stage had its own purpose and 
objectives (see also chapter 4.1.). For this reason, the episodes were grouped 
per stage as it might help to reveal practices that are typical for each stage. 
Johnson et al. (2007, 61) point out that once the unit of analysis is defined, the 
next question is sampling, i.e. how many and which specific units of analysis to 
include in the research and where to find information on the selected units. In 
the case of strategic episodes, Johnson et al. suggest ensuring that there is a 
dimensional variance between the sampled episodes, so that the episodes can 
be contrasted and compared against each other. Furthermore, an effort should 
be made to “collect information from as many sources as possible and as 
completely as possible on that unit to ensure it is fully understood”. (ibid., 62). 
As indicated above, the sample consisted of the formal episodes during the 
four stages in the formulation process, which have dimensional variance in 
terms of the specific purpose and objectives that are set forth for each stage.  
The answer to research sub-question RQ1b “What are the traits of the 
strategy content that is formulated by a newly appointed top management 
team?” was derived through document analysis. Document analysis is a 
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qualitative research method that is suitable for the systematically analysis of 
organizational and institutional documents (Bowen 2009, 27). The researcher 
must, however, evaluate, whether the document is relevant to the research 
question and fits within the framework of the study (Bowen 2009, 33). In this 
case, the strategy document was accepted by the case company’s board of 
directors as the official statement of the strategy, and was released in the same 
form to the case company’s organization. As such it was relevant for the study 
and was as a suitable data source for examining the traits of the formulated 
strategy content, thereby answering the second research sub-question. 
Furthermore, using an organizational document as data source fits within the 
theoretical framework since strategy-as-practice based research considers 
documents as one of the potential data sources for conducting research (Vaara 
& Whittington 2012, 315). Document analysis is often used in combination 
with other qualitative research methods to allow for triangulation (Bowen 
2009, 28). In this study, the top management team members were asked 
about the traits of the content of the strategy document during the face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews, which thus provides complementary data. 
Once the answer to both research sub-questions was provided, the answer to 
the main research question could be derived. 
A schematic representation of the research design can be found in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Design of the research 
 
3.2 Research context 
Ethnography places high importance on the context of the research. Context 
refers to the various institutional, organisational, historical, economic, societal 
and environmental factors that may influence the behaviour and beliefs of 
groups and individuals. (LeCompte & Schensul 2010, 22.)  
The context that is relevant for this study was the case company’s 
organization, its business environment, and the organizational and strategic 
antecedents that led to the initiation of the strategy renewal project. 
3.2.1 The case company 
The case company was a Finnish privately-owned company that developed, 
sold and supplied industrial equipment. Besides its Finnish headquarter, the 
case company had two subsidiaries abroad. The case company employed about 
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350 persons (2015), of which 70% are based in Finland, the remaining 30% 
abroad.  
The main customer base of the case company consisted of European and 
North-American OEMs and Tier1 / Tier2 suppliers that were that are active in 
a broad range of industries.  
The case company’s customers varied widely in terms of magnitude of their 
operations, with local SMEs at one end of the spectrum to large multinationals 
at the other side.  
3.2.2 Antecedents of the strategy process in the case company 
Until the early 2000’s, the case company–at the time an SME–had been able 
to achieve rapid growth. Demand for the case company’s rather unique 
products had been high and domestic and international sales revenues had 
increased all the time as competition was scarce, few substitutes were available 
and customers accepted premium pricing.  
The financial-economic crisis that started in 2008-2009, however, triggered 
changes in the business environment. New players entered the industry and 
competition for market share increased. Since many customers were 
themselves impacted by the economic downturn, fewer of them had the 
possibility to invest in industrial solutions. Competitive strategies in the 
industry gradually shifted from differentiation to cost competition, since 
customers began to gain more and more bargaining power. The combined 
effect of these changes in the business environment and the lack of adequate 
and timely response caused a decline in the case company’s sales revenues, 
aggravated by a decline in profitability. 
In an attempt to rectify the situation, the case company’s upper management–
basically the managing director, sometimes assisted by a few middle level 
managers–released a new strategy. Despite the level of detail of the strategy, it 
had several shortcomings in its content, which caused difficulties to 
communicate and implement the strategy in the organization. The fact that the 
strategy had been complied by an external consultancy firm had raised 
questions about its validity, not only amongst the case company’s employees, 
but also amongst several of its operative managers. 
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The new strategy had called for several organizational changes. Because the 
company had outgrown the SME stage, it had been decided that the company 
needed more formal structures and processes.  The most important changes 
were the following:   
• The board of directors appointed a CEO, who was to replace the 
managing director. The new CEO had been on the case company’s board 
of directors since a few years, and had in parallel been responsible for the 
operative management of the case company’s business units.  
• The new CEO initiated initiatives to develop and/or renew the 
management system, the core internal processes and organizational 
structure. Furthermore, the CEO formed a top management team whose 
core responsibility was to become strategic management. The new top 
management team consisted for the most part of managers who were 
promoted from middle management positions and of one external 
recruitment.  
Given the issues with the existing strategy and the organizational changes, the 
board of directors decided that the strategy had to be updated once again. 
Consequently, the CEO initiated a strategy renewal project.  
The single condition set forth by the CEO was that the strategy renewal project 
would be the exclusive task of the newly appointed top management team, 
without intervention or support of any external parties, such as business 
consultants. The CEO’s rationale for doing so was twofold: First, it would 
strengthen the collaboration within the newly appointed top management 
team; secondly it would make the executive management team more 
committed to the strategy. To underline the top management team’s 
responsibility in strategy matters, the CEO renamed it as “strategic 
management team”.  
The CEO insisted on an explicit strategy renewal process: bounded in time, 
with a clear start and end. The CEO gave as rationale for this approach the 
urgency for drastic renewal of the strategy, which he thought was only 
achievable through an explicit strategy renewal project, as it would give strong 
signal to the organization that the changing business environment required 
substantial strategic change. As such, strategy formulation and 
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implementation were to be conceived as two consecutive “projects”, each with 
a scope, a deadline and a deliverable. The deliverable of the formulation 
project was the new strategy. As explained earlier, this study will focus on the 
formulation process. 
3.2.3 Organizational structure of the case company 
As explained above, a new organizational structure was set up prior to the start 
of the strategy renewal project. The members of the newly appointed top 
management team were given the responsibility to lead the upper-level 
organizational functions, which are shown in Figure 6.  
Products and services were offered through three different business units, two 
of which focused on providing technical solution to specific customer ranges, 
while the third one offered more service-related solutions. Business units had 
profit & loss responsibility. In addition to the three product lines, the major 
organizational units were: Sales & Marketing, Project Management and 
Support Functions (HR, Finance, IT), Finance, Business development and 
Quality Management.  
 
 
Figure 6. Upper-level organization chart of the case company at the start of the 
strategy renewal project 
 
3.2.4 Principal actors in the strategy formulation process 
The nine actors that were to conduct the strategy formulation process were 
determined by the CEO. These “strategists”, as I will call them hereafter, bore 
the final responsibility for developing and releasing the new strategy. The 
CEO
Business 
Unit A
Business 
Unit B
Business 
unit C
Sales & 
Marketing
Project 
Management
Support 
functions
Finance Business 
development
Quality 
management
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group consisted of the CEO, the six members of the newly appointed top 
management team and two middle management members. Two strategy 
project coordinators (hereafter called “coordinators”) were appointed to 
coordinate the practicalities of the process and comprised one of the 
strategists (in a combined role) and one middle management team member. 
The lists of all actors and their role are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Main actors in the strategy renewal process 
 Role Actors 
Strategists Group of nine strategists, 
responsible for creating the new 
strategy. This group included 
the seven members of the 
strategic management team (the 
TMT), to which two members of 
the operative management were 
added as the CEO considered 
their input crucial for the 
strategy renewal team. 
• Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
• Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
• Vice President, Business Unit A 
• Vice President, Business Unit B  
• Vice President, Business Unit C  
• Vice President, Sales & Marketing 
• Vice President, Global Projects 
• Director of Business Development 
• Director of Marketing 
Strategy 
project 
coordinators 
Primarily responsible for 
coordinating the activities 
during the strategy development 
process (workshop planning and 
facilitation, scheduling, 
documenting the process) 
• Director of Business Development 
(combined role as strategist) 
• Director of Quality Development  
 
All strategists were male, and of Finnish nationality. All held office in the 
Finnish HQ except for one Business Unit Vice President, who was located at 
the central-European subsidiary (of which he also was the Managing Director). 
The age of the strategists at the start of the strategy formulation process was 
between 32 and 56 years. Their tenure in the case company varied between 0 
and 32 years, with an average of 12 years. One member had joined the case 
company just prior to the start of the strategy renewal project; three out of 
nine members had no working experience from companies other than the case 
company. The number of years of involvement in strategy matters varied 
between 0 and 20 years, with an average of 6 years. For three strategists, out 
of nine it was the first time to be involved in any form of strategy development 
activities. All strategists were holder of a Master of Science degree. 
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3.3 Data collection 
As pointed out in 3.1, data was collected by means of participatory observation 
and interviews. The following table summarizes the approach for the 
observations and interviews that were conducted in this study. 
Table 2. Observations and interviews as ethnographic data-collection 
methods, as used in this study (adapted from LeCompte & Schensul, 2010, 
175-176) 
Data 
collection 
method 
Purpose Target Procedure Data content 
Participatory 
observation 
Record 
situations as 
they happen 
Activities 
Events & 
sequences 
Behaviors of 
individuals and 
groups 
Conversations 
Interactions 
Written field 
notes 
Depiction of  
Physical setting 
Acts 
Activities 
Interaction 
patterns 
Meanings 
Beliefs 
Emotions 
Objects 
Ethnographic 
interview 
In-depth 
information on 
selected topics 
Description of 
practices 
Representative 
individuals 
In-depth 
semi-structured 
interview 
Answers to 
open question 
 
 
Furthermore, documents are used as complementary data source for 
evaluating the content of the newly formulated strategy. 
3.3.1 Data collection through participatory observation 
Data about the strategizing practices was collected through observing the 
strategists during the formal praxis episodes of the strategy formulation 
process.  
The observation was participatory, meaning that the researcher “immerses 
himself in the social setting and takes part in relevant activities” and 
unstructured, thus recording as much as possible in order to develop a 
narrative account of the observations. (Harding 2013, 21.) 
For this study, the researcher was granted access to the formal strategy 
episodes, which were mostly meetings or workshops, either in the case 
company’s facilities or on location. During the first formal meeting, the CEO 
explained to the strategists that the researcher was going to conduct a study 
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about the strategy formulation process and therefore was to participate in all 
meetings and workshops. The researcher briefed all strategists about the scope 
of the study and responds to any questions. Through this introduction, a first 
rapport was created between the researcher and strategists. Creating such 
rapport is primordial in ethnographic research as it creates the basis of trust 
between researcher and participants in the study (Ladner 2016, 117). The 
researcher sustained rapport throughout the study by adapting to and 
respecting the strategists’ common ways of doing, thus by “being part without 
being in the way”.  
Ethnographic researchers are not observing “only when they have their 
notebook open” but are continuously ready to record relevant data (Ladner, 
2016, 129).  In that sense, attention was also paid to what happened before, 
after and between meetings and workshops, for instance when strategists 
engaged in small talk or informal chatting. 
Handwritten field notes were taken to record the observations. A laptop was 
not used because this might lessen rapport (Ladner 2016, 62-63) and because 
participants in the meetings and workshops were asked not to use their laptop. 
After each event, the handwritten notes were transcribed into an Microsoft 
Excel worksheet to allow clarity and coding (see 3.4). In total, 115 hours of 
observations were carried out for the study. 
To ensure that the right focus is kept during the observations, the researcher 
needs a clear theoretical orientation that helps to select which observations are 
important and which are not (Ladner 2016, 122, LeCompte & Schensul 2013, 
79). In this study, a substantial literature review was conducted in preparation 
for the observations. Since ethnography is a recursive process, additional 
literature was continuously reviewed during the data collection process, 
whenever observations revealed new or unexpected findings. 
3.3.2 Data collection through semi-structured interviews 
After the release of the new strategy to the organization, the researcher 
conducted face-to-face interviews with the nine strategists. The purpose of the 
interview was twofold. Firstly, it provided an ex-post reflection on the strategy 
process by the strategists, in which they looked back on the main activities and 
practices that had occurred in the process, which helped to answer research 
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question RQ1a; secondly the strategists were asked about the content of the 
strategy they had formulated, which supported answering research question 
RQ1b.  
Since the interviews were conducted after the formulation process, the 
interview questions about the process were intended to either validate certain 
observations or to complete observational data. The interview structure was 
divided into three main parts, each of which was split into topics. The first part 
of the interview dealt with the strategy formulation process, and the topics 
were ordered according the consecutive stages in the strategy process. The 
second part dealt with the outcome of the strategy process, namely the new 
strategy, and the topics were related to the content of the new strategy. The 
third part was about the strategist’ personal experience of the formulation 
process. The interview guide can be found in Appendix 1. 
The interviews were held at the premises of the company. A two-hour slot was 
foreseen for each interview, with a possibility to extend it for another half 
hour. The interviews lasted between 65 and 145 minutes. At the start of the 
interview, the researcher explained the purpose of the interview (further 
improve the understanding about the strategy development process and its 
outcome) and its objective (gather comments on the strategy development 
process and its outcome from the individual strategists). The interviewees 
were told that the interview results are anonymous. To help recalling the 
events during the process, the interviewees were given a visual aid consisting 
of seven A4 pages that depicted pictures or graphs that were relevant to each 
strategy episode.  
All interviewees gave their consent for the interviewee to be recorded. During 
the interviews, notes were taken about significant comments, as well as about 
non-verbal cues such as facial expressions and gestures. The first interview 
was conducted with the CEO, and was simultaneously used as a pre-test to 
validate the interview method and structure. However, no changes were 
required and the same method and structure was used for the remaining 
interviews. 
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3.3.3 Data from documents 
In this study, the strategy document that was compiled by the top 
management team was used as a complementary data source. The strategy 
document consisted of a 70-page document that was published in the form of a 
printed slide set in pdf-format. The document was released as an official 
written statement of the strategy on the case company’s intranet and was used 
to communicate the strategy to the organization.  
3.4 Data analysis 
3.4.1 Ethnographic data analysis 
Ethnographic data analysis is a recursive process, during which the ideas of 
what has been discovered are continuously modified and elaborated. As such, 
data analysis starts already after the first data have been collected. (LeCompte 
& Schensul 2010, 179).  
The analysis of ethnographic data implies that all data–in this study obtained 
through observations and interviews–are considered. The first step is dividing 
the dataset in conceptual groups or categories, for which LeCompte & 
Schensul (2010, 200) describe three typical approaches, namely:  
• Classifying information according conceptual categories set derived from 
the theoretical framework, 
• Sorting information according common, straightforward categories, 
• Inductive searching the dataset for smaller and larger themes and 
patterns. 
Each of these approaches require multiple readings of the entire data set until 
a ”picture emerges from the morass of observations, interviews and other 
kinds of information”, and in practice, all three approaches will be used during 
data analysis (ibid., 203-204). 
Analysis of the data starts from the concrete item-unit level analysis and goes 
via pattern-level and structural-level analysis to the point where abstract 
interpretations can be formed. This leads to construct a set of results, which 
are still closely related to the actual events. Next comes interpretation of the 
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results, which means that the results are being explained according various 
levels of theory. These levels go from the local level of theory, over the middle-
range theory to the paradigmatic level of theory. Local theory explains the 
events as experienced by participants in the study, in their setting. Middle-
range theory seeks to explain the results beyond the local setting, for instance 
in similar environments or communities. The paradigmatic level of theory 
goes one step further, to the point where theory becomes abstract and thus 
more generalizable. (LeCompte & Schensul 2010, 220-224.) 
The same approach was followed in this study. During the study, all data were 
gathered in an MS Excel worksheet. Next, specific items were extracted and 
coded. Initially a list of initial pre-defined codes was used–mostly derived 
from the reviewed literature and the strategy-as-practice framework–or codes 
were simple terms that described for instance the kind of event or its location. 
As data came in, the data set was reviewed, which lead to the definition of new 
codes or the refinement of existing codes. Simultaneously, during each review 
of the dataset, a search for patterns and themes was conducted. This entire 
process was recursive throughout the study until the final patterns and themes 
emerged. 
This study focused on a single case, and therefore the results are explained 
mainly using local level of theory. Nevertheless, based on these local level 
theory explanations, propositions were formed that allow future research to 
validate the explanations in similar environments, which in turn may advance 
the theory beyond the local level. 
3.4.2 Document analysis 
Document analysis requires examining, reading and interpretation. It is a 
process that consists both of content analysis and thematic analysis. Content 
analysis is the classification of information according pre-defined categories 
that are central to the study. Thematic analysis aims to recognize patterns in 
the data until themes emerge, which will be used as categories for analysis. 
(Bowen 2009, 32-34.) 
The approach for content analysis in this study was derived from the method 
proposed in Pandit’s (1996) study about corporate turnaround, which uses 
documents as principal data source. For this study, the method was adapted to 
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define a list of “traits of good strategy content”. First, a content analysis of 
literature sources was conducted to define which traits of strategy content are 
characteristic for “good strategies”. Based on the results of the analysis, a list 
of “traits of good strategy content” was derived, both for corporate and 
business strategy content. Next, the content of the actual strategy document–
as compiled by the strategists in the case company–was compared against the 
traits proposed by literature. This comparison allowed to assess which of the 
proposed “traits of good strategy” were strongly present in the actual strategy, 
which were weakly present and which were absent. 
 The approach for the evaluation is depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Approach for evaluating the traits of the content of the new strategy 
As document evaluation in this study was used for verification–as complement 
to other methods–the literature review did not have to be extensive (Bowen 
2009, 33). The basis for selecting the literature was that the sources allowed 
set forth unambiguous criteria for corporate and/or business strategy content. 
Four literature sources were selected: Hofer & Schendel (1978, 42), Andrews 
(1987, 27-34), Porter (2008, 115-116) and Rumelt (2012, 11-22). 
To allow triangulation of data, the top management team members were also 
asked about the traits during the individual semi-structured interviews. 
3.5 Reliability and validity 
Rowley (2002, 20-21) summarizes four common tests to assure the quality of 
social research:  
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• Construct validity is achieved defining proper measures for the 
phenomena being studied in order to reduce subjectivity, through linking 
the data collection questions and measures with the research questions, 
• Internal validity is achieved by constructing a clear causal relationship 
between certain conditions that are proven to cause the emergence of 
other conditions, 
• External validity is to be assured through correctly defining the domain 
boundaries to which the research findings can be applied, 
• Reliability aims at assuring that the research can be replicated, that is, 
that similar data sets will lead to similar findings, and is achieved 
through proper documentation of the data collection procedures and the 
collected data sets. 
Construct validity in this study was ensured through thorough literature 
review prior and during the study and through continuous review of the 
collected data during the study, as is typical in ethnography. 
The approach for ensuring internal validity in this study was to combine three 
different data collection methods, as explained in 3.1. Furthermore, the data 
collection happened over a period that was long enough (seven months) to 
verify and confirm the validity of the data multiple times. 
In terms of external validity, the findings of this study, being an ethnographic 
case, study cannot be generalized. However, as explained in 3.4, the findings 
in this study are used to define propositions that allow validation in similar 
settings through future research. 
In this study, reliability was assured through involving all participants in the 
study in order to capture all the sayings and doings that are relevant, and 
through consistent application of the data collection and analysis methods. 
However, one cannot deny that there may have occurred events (e.g. informal 
chats, unforeseen events in the organizations, external events, etc. that have 
not been observed and documented, but may have impacted the strategy 
formulation process and its outcomes. 
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3.6 Ethical considerations 
Ethnographic researchers must pay attention to ethical commitments 
(Bryman & Bell 2007, 449). The design of the research needs to take into 
account the ethical considerations that dictate “how to protect the people they 
are studying against risk, including social, physical, financial and emotional 
harm or damage to their reputation”. If such risks exist, the researcher should 
bring them to the attention of the participants in order to give them the 
opportunity to properly (re-)consider their participation in the study. 
Furthermore, risks should not only be evaluated with regards to the 
individuals that take part in the study but also in respect to the wider 
community or institution they represent. (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010, 285-
286.) 
A researcher has also a power position over the participants because he/she 
ultimately decides what will be published and disseminated. Because 
ethnographic research implies a strong rapport between researcher and 
participants, it may happen that participants–consciously or not–disclose 
private or secret information. Therefore, researchers must accept that they are 
bound to ethical standards that aim to protect participants, and thus must 
refrain from disclosing irrelevant or harmful information. (LeCompte & 
Schensul 2010, 303-304.) 
In this study, the subject was the strategy making of a specific company, which 
is a highly sensitive and confidential subject. The researcher had direct access 
to high-level information about the company and the actions, opinions and 
ideas of its executives. It goes beyond doubt that inappropriate disclosure of 
such information would harm the company, the executives and basically any 
stakeholder to the firm.  
At the start of the study, the researcher discussed the ethical considerations 
with the CEO and the following guidelines were agreed: 
• The name of the case company was not to be published; contextual 
information about the company was only provided when relevant and 
required for the study, and in a way that did not allow identifying the 
company. 
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• Anonymity of participants in the study was to be guaranteed by not 
disclosing information that would allow identifying the participants. 
• No strategic or operations data (e.g. figures, names, locations…) that 
would allow identifying the case company were to be disclosed. 
In summary, the researcher committed himself to publish only data that were 
relevant for conducting the study and are required to demonstrate its validity. 
These guidelines were communicated to the participants at the start of the 
study, after which all participants gave their consent for participation. The 
guidelines were reconfirmed at the end of the study. Approval for publication 
of the study was granted on condition that all the above-mentioned guidelines 
are respected. 
4 Results 
4.1 Outline of the strategy formulation process 
The CEO and CFO, together with the coordinators, had decided on the outline 
for the formulation process, which consisted of four separate, consecutive, 
stages in a 21-week period. As explained in 3.1, each stage represents a unit of 
analysis in this study.  
• The briefing stage was intended to introduce the rationale, objective and 
timeframe of the strategy renewal project to the strategists. 
• During the analysis stage, a series of analysis activities was to be set up to 
gather and review information about the company’s internal and external 
business environment. 
• In the prototype stage, potential strategic scenarios were to be explored 
using the findings of the analyses and guided by the CEO’s statement 
about the vision of the company (what kind of future the company 
envisions) and its purpose (how it will actually contribute in realizing 
that future). 
• The objective of the formulation stage was to create the final strategy by 
using the outcomes of the prototyping stage and formulate a strategy 
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document that could be released and communicated to the entire 
organization. 
The outline was considered as a “manageable framework” that would allow for 
adjustment if necessary. The initial outline is shown Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Initial outline of the strategy formulation process, indicating its four 
major stages and timeline 
In each stage, one or more workshops or meetings were organized. Workshops 
were used for more creative activities, while meetings were intended for 
discussion and decision making. The meetings and workshops for each stage 
were planned at the start of that stage, one stage at a time, and plans could be 
changed during the stage if necessary. All strategists had to attend all 
workshops and meetings. The practical organization and facilitation of the 
workshops was done by the coordinators.  
4.2 The briefing stage 
The aim of the briefing was to introduce the objectives and the outline of the 
renewal project to the strategists, before the actual start of the project.   
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Two separate two-hour briefings were organized and facilitated by the 
coordinators since there was no time slot available that suited all strategists. 
During the briefing, the coordinators presented the scope of the strategy 
renewal project, its timeline and the practical organization and gave an 
overview of some strategy-related concepts and topics1 that were deemed 
essential to know about. Attendees could freely raise comments on any of the 
subjects.  
In both briefings, the discussion was rather fragmented, with the strategists 
commenting on many topics, without entering in a structured discussion. 
Several strategists used the situation to express their individual dissatisfaction 
or worries about existing issues.  
4.2.1 Building consensus about the scope and approach of the strategy 
renewal 
The kind of topics that were discussed differed between the two briefings. The 
four strategists that participated in the first briefing brought up topics that 
were much related to business (competitive) strategy, such as the state of 
product-market fit, sales strategies and the deployment of resources and 
capabilities. In linguistic terms, some of the strategists used strategic 
management terms and concepts on several occasions, however without 
providing explanations to the other strategists–who not always seemed to 
understand was meant by these terms. During the second briefing, the 
strategists used much more plain language.  
In both briefings, the strategists brought up many, sometimes unrelated, 
topics that were related to their organizational function, in a fast pace. The 
emotions expressed when bringing up these themes – e.g. through speaking in 
a louder voice, or in an angry tone, sighing, using gestures – were rather 
negative and indicated that these themes were important to them personally, 
but that they had caused issues. The wording they used expressed obligation 
(“we must..”, “we need to…”) and advice (“we should…”). This is demonstrated 
by the following discussion in the first briefing: 
                                                   
1 The topics included: Porter’s generic strategies, the resource-based view of strategy, dynamic 
capabilities, strategy from an innovation perspective, importance of a strategy, vision and 
purpose 
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Strategist A: “we need to determine what are our threshold competences 
and core competences…”  
Strategist B (interrupts A): “…and we should start analyses from zero and 
not again rely on earlier assumptions.” 
Strategist C (thinking loud, skeptical): “…can we even grow in a mature 
market… in fact we don’t really know what is driving our product 
segments, sales channels and customer segments.”  
Strategist A : “yes, we definitely need a sales channel strategy. Should we 
focus more on direct sales? Or find new partners?... organic growth might 
not be an option, we probably need new business models. And how about 
strategic business units?”  
Strategist B: “yes, we should study different possible business models, first 
separately and then maybe combine them.” 
The need for a vision and purpose statement to guide the development of the 
new strategy was as well discussed in the first briefing: 
Strategist A: “our main strategy has just been a bunch of financial 
targets… but what is our real vision and our purpose.” 
Strategist B: “The vision and purpose is under consideration by [the 
CEO].” 
Strategist C: “yes, it’s a good idea to define our vision and mission, I mean 
the vision of the world and the mission of [case company].” 
Strategist A: “I think the process of defining vision and mission should be 
inspiring [for developing the strategy].” 
Strategist B: “well, vision and mission are maybe not the words we want 
to use, but yes they should be the guiding idea during the strategy work.”  
During the second briefing, which was attended by the CEO and four other 
strategists, the comments were more related to corporate aspect of strategy. 
The amount of comments was much less than in the first briefing. The CEO, 
who was already familiar with all the material, was keen to make statements 
on most of the presented material, in an explanatory tone, directed to the four 
other attendees. Consequently, the other attendees seemed to be cautious, and 
did not make a lot of comments.  
Despite the–sometimes–unstructured discussions, most strategist agreed that 
the initial briefing had helped to aligned them around the goal of the strategy 
project. A few strategists, however, had still doubts whether consensus on the 
goals of the project (which they referred to by the term “alignment”) had been 
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achieved after the briefing, although they could not explain why. For one 
strategist, it was “just a feeling that there was no alignment”.  
4.2.2 Discussing about the role of the middle management in the 
strategy formulation process 
The strategists also reflected on their role in strategy development versus the 
role of the operative management members (in the case company also called 
“middle management”, both terms were used to refer to the same group of 
persons), and how to involve the operative management team in the strategy 
formulation process: 
Strategist A: “who will the key people to provide the information [i.e. 
outcome of the analyses]?  
Strategist B: “I think middle management can play a role here, actually if 
they feel involved it will help with the acceptance of the new strategy.” 
Strategist C: ”Good point, in fact what will be the role of the [middle] 
management in the strategy process?” 
Strategist A: “They are key in the implementation. They might not be 
knowledgeable about all aspects of strategy… Should we use the operative 
management meetings to keep them involved?” 
Strategist C: “Yes, than they know what is going on.” 
Despite the discussion about the role of the middle management in the 
strategy formulation and the intention to “keep them involved”, there were no 
decisions made about to achieve this in practice. The way how the strategists 
talked about the middle management was worth noting. Some strategists were 
just promoted from a middle management role while two strategists were still 
active in a middle management role. Nevertheless, the language that the 
strategists used in their discourse strongly emphasized the “we” (“strategists”) 
versus the “they” (non-strategists). 
The “operative management meeting” to which the strategists referred in the 
conversation was a monthly meeting between the top management team 
(including most strategists) and the operative management team (middle 
management team). This meeting was set up to exchange information between 
both management levels, and as now proposed as forum to exchange 
information about the strategy formulation process. However, during an 
informal inquiry with some middle management members about the amount 
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of information they got about the strategy formulation process during the 
monthly meeting, most middle managers replied that the information they got 
was very scarce. 
4.2.3 The strategists assume that strategic management skills develop 
through practice 
One of the objectives of the briefing was to achieve a common understanding 
about the strategic management concepts, because not all strategists had 
earlier experience in strategy development. One strategist explained that in 
this stage of the strategy formulation process “the level of experience in 
strategy development was low for some members”. Nevertheless, most 
strategists were reacting rather skeptical when these strategic management 
concepts were presented, and some laughed when it was suggested that they 
could or should “prepare themselves” for the strategy development activities, 
e.g. by reading certain articles on strategic management. Although most the 
strategists agreed that the briefing had helped them to understand the 
strategic concepts that were going to be used during the strategy development, 
several of them had doubts about the use of such concepts or dismissed them 
as too theoretical. Some strategists indicated that learning and understanding 
strategic concepts is more a matter of practice, of "learning by doing". One 
strategist found that  
The [concepts presented in the] briefing was too theoretical … that is not 
realistic, it is impossible to get on the same [theoretical, academic] level. 
The effort to do [background] research [about strategic management] 
should be [reduced to a] minimum for management team members. 
Or, as stated by another strategist: “understanding of strategy concepts comes 
mostly when using the concepts”. 
When reflecting upon the whole strategy formulation process, one strategist, 
agreed that, while some learning had been achieved through practice, it would 
have been better if the overall level of strategic management skills had been 
higher from the start of the process:  
[During the briefing] we should have spent more effort on the definition of 
strategy [concepts]. After the project it was [for many strategists] more 
clear than at the time of the briefing. 
58 
 
   
4.3 The analysis stage 
The purpose of the analysis stage was to gather and review information about 
the internal and external business environment. At the time that the analysis 
stage started, there was little factual information available in the organization 
about the business environment. There were no processes or systems for 
systematic information gathering, storing or assessment. 
For this reason, a series of six analyses was defined for assessing the firm’s 
internal and external environment. The three external analyses were:  
environmental, industry and competitor analysis. The three internal analyses 
were: supply chain, capability and category maturity analysis. The 
coordinators decided on the preferred approach for each analysis, which was 
based either on common practices, models retrieved from strategic 
management literature or a combination of both. Except for the capability 
analysis, all analyses were carried out by dedicated workgroups that consisted 
for the most parts of middle management team members and experts (e.g. 
sales managers, R&D managers, production planners), although the CEO 
participated in two analysis activities. The coordinators assigned the 
workgroup participants based on their function and/or experience relevant to 
the analysis to be done. Each coordinator participated in two or three analysis 
teams as facilitator or observer. Each of the workgroups convened three to five 
times during the four-week period of the analysis. Members who were located 
at offices abroad participated virtually via web-conferencing.  
The strategists insisted on taking the lead in the capability analysis, which was 
facilitated by a researcher from a local university2, and to which also a few 
middle managers were invited. 
The objective, approach, participants and outcomes of each analysis are 
summarized in Table 3. The researcher participated as observer in the 
competitor and capability analyses activities. The outcomes of the other 
analyses were reported to the researcher by the coordinators who had 
facilitated the analysis activities.  
                                                   
2 The strategists preferred to use a method for capability analysis that had been developed by a 
local university. Since the method was new, the researchers who had developed the method 
suggested to facilitate the analysis activity at the case company to make sure that the method 
was used as intended. 
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Table 3. Summary of the analysis activities: objective, approach, outcomes and main observations of the analysis processes 
Analysis  Objective Approach / 
Method 
Functions 
represented 
(number of 
participants) 
Outcomes of the analysis and observations about the 
analysis process 
Competitor 
analysis 
Define the principal 
competitors and assess 
their strategic behavior 
Competitor 
Analysis 
(Fleischer & 
Bensoussan, 
2003, 144-161) 
Sales & Marketing 
management, Product 
Management (12) 
Few substantial data were gathered. Most sales managers had no 
comprehensive understanding of the competitive environment; 
some were reluctant to share information, or the information was 
biased and sometimes contradictory. Focus was on comparing 
competitors’ product portfolios. Failed to assess competitors’ 
strategic behavior due to lack of consistent information. 
Industry 
analysis 
Define the trends and the 
dynamics of competition 
of the industry in which 
the firm operates 
Formal 
Discourse 
CEO, R&D 
management, business 
development (4) 
Succeeded in pointing out major trends in the industry, but failed to 
assess their impact (positive or negative) on the firm’s business. 
Failed to provide understanding about the dynamics of competition. 
Environmental 
analysis 
Assessment of major 
social, technological, 
economical, environment 
and political trends 
STEEP Analysis 
(Fleischer & 
Bensoussan, 
2003, 269-283) 
CEO, R&D 
management (3) 
Allowed building three thematic scenarios and assessing their 
impact on the firm’s business operations. 
Outcomes were for the most part based on high-level assumptions, 
less on factual data. Used very narrow set of data sources. 
Capability 
analysis 
Appraisal of capabilities 
vs. their strategic 
importance 
Strategic 
capability index 
(Halme et al. 
2015) 
7 teams, each consisting 
of 2-3 strategists and 1-
2 middle management 
member 
Assessment of 700+ statements about seven areas of organizational 
capabilities. Strategists assessed the capabilities under their 
responsibility and had limited knowledge of benchmark capability 
levels in the industry, which affected the accuracy of the ratings. 
Category 
maturity 
analysis 
Assess technological 
maturity of the firm’s 
extant and planned 
offering portfolio 
Category 
Maturity Life-
Cycle Analysis 
(Moore 2008, 
13-19, 192-196) 
R&D management, 
business development 
(3) 
Analysis succeeded in determining the technological maturity of the 
case company’s products and services, and in identifying emerging 
technologies. The results of the analysis were however difficult to 
interpret and the rationale used for categorizing the products and 
services was not fully clear for outsiders. 
Supply chain 
analysis 
Understand the strategic 
role of supply chain 
partners 
Formal 
Discourse 
business development, 
Supply chain 
management (3) 
The analysis described extant strategic partnerships along the 
supply chain, and offered some possibilities for improvement. 
Nevertheless, the analysis remained on a rather abstract level. 
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When all the analysis activities were done, a two-day off-site workshop was set 
up to review the outcome of the analyses (first day) and use the information 
for creating prototype strategic scenarios (second day, see 4.4). Each 
coordinator presented the reviews of the analysis he had facilitated to the 
strategists. A half hour slot was foreseen for each presentation.  
4.3.1 Managing knowledge in the organization 
All strategists agreed that the analysis stage had been a required step in the 
strategy renewal process. The capability analysis and competitor analysis were 
by far considered as the most important of the six analyses, not only in the 
current strategy renewal process, but also for strategy renewal processes in 
general. 
Most strategists acknowledged that the analyses had provided them with new 
insights, that is, had revealed information or knowledge that had previously 
been unknown to them individually. One strategist summarized that “the 
analyses had opened many eyes”. Beside lack of information, the analysis 
activities had facilitated the sharing of information, which was a persistent 
issue in the case company’s organization. For instance, sales managers were 
known to have a lot of information about competitors, but were not always 
willing to share it. As one strategist told: “so far, competitor information was 
mostly in the head of [the sales] crew, now it was for the first time converted 
into shared knowledge”. Moreover, according one strategist, the analysis had 
also helped to correct biased information:   
Most of the analyses improved our knowledge level and [doing the 
analyses] helped to create a common base of information, so there is less 
bias of personal opinions. 
Despite being positive about the analysis as activity, the strategists were 
confronted with several issues during the review of the analysis results.  
A first issue was that even after eight weeks of analysis there were still many 
missing answers. Nevertheless, the strategist agreed that despite the two 
months of analysis work it wouldn’t have been feasible to gather more data, 
considering the available resources and the fact that “[the analyses] had to 
start from scratch”, because this was the first time that systematic analyses 
had been performed by the organization. The second issue was that the 
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information that had been collected was not always conclusive answers and 
some information had even been contradictory.  
The question was how to cope with these deficiencies. One option was to 
continue to gather information, in order to find more and better information. 
For instance, the strategists decided that the competitor analysis was to be 
continued, because there was too much lack of information, but then 
immediately disagreed about the desired level of completeness of the analyses. 
Some strategists told that more in-depth information was required for the 
strategy development, while other found that there would never be enough 
information and that it was a matter of using the information that was 
available in the right manner. This led to a next discussion, namely what to do 
with the data, if data would become available. As one strategist said: “[before 
demanding more data] we should know better what we want to achieve with 
data” or, as another strategist told: “we should first [first] learn how to turn 
the result of all these analyses into action”. 
Most of the analyses had been carried out by middle management members, 
while only the capability analysis had been mainly led by the strategists. The 
strategists had only briefly reviewed the results of the analysis conducted by 
the operative managers but had not discussed the results with the middle 
management members. Some strategists felt that it would have been better if 
both groups would have more closely interacted during the analysis, because 
any new knowledge was important for all of them: “if [the strategy team 
members] would have participated in [all] the analyses, even partly, than we 
would have created a shared opinion [about the results of the analysis and 
their interpretation]”.  
Several strategists acknowledged that the analysis practice had been new to 
them, and that the lack of experience may have hindered the practice. As one 
strategist said: “the analysis stage was a kind of learning for [us] all, we were 
not prepared for this kind of work”.  
4.3.2 Strategists’ struggle to assess the organizational capabilities 
As explained above, the gathering of data had been mainly the task of groups 
of middle managers. However, the strategists had insisted in taking the lead in 
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the data gathering about the organizational capabilities, and thus were the 
main assessors in that activity. This allowed observing how the strategists 
engaged in analysis activities. As indicated in Table 3, one of the concerns 
observed during the analysis activity was that some participants tended to 
discount deficiencies in specific capabilities that were under their respective 
responsibility (for instance, because they anticipated improvements), and thus 
rated the capability as if the improvement had already been successfully 
realized. Secondly, the purpose was to rate the capabilities against industry 
benchmark levels. However, the lack of knowledge about benchmark levels 
caused additional confusion during the evaluation. 
Strategist A (addresses strategist B in a mocking voice): “Oh, are you sure 
about [capability X], I don’t see where that number [a rating 4 out of 5] 
comes from.” 
Strategist B (slightly embarrassed): “Well, we are doing a lot to improve 
this, and we have made already a lot of progress.” 
Strategist A (cynical): “Oh, so you have been giving ratings for [the level] 
you expect to reach, I thought we would rate today’s situation.” 
Strategist C (to strategist B): “How far is that [i.e. actual level of capability 
X] from the rating you gave?” 
Strategist B: “Maybe… I would say maybe a 2 but I believe we get it soon 
to a 4… that is why I gave it a 4… “ 
Strategist A: “Yes, but we are talking about today…I think it is not much 
more than a 2… if I see what happened when [gives some example of a 
recent event to demonstrate that capability X has issues].” 
Strategist C: “2 3 or 4… what level should it be, do we know how others 
[competitors] are doing on this? I mean, maybe a 2 can be ok if the 
[competition] is on a level 1.” 
Strategist A: “If you ask me I think we are anyhow better than the 
competition.” 
Strategist B: “so what is it now, do we give then 3 because we are better 
than the rest?” 
In many case a kind of compromise about the rating levels was negotiated 
between the strategists. The lack of knowledge about reference capability 
levels in the industry caused that the results of the capability analysis showed 
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the relative level of the capabilities within the company, rather than measuring 
them against industry or competitor capability benchmarks. 
4.4 The prototyping stage 
The purpose of the prototype stage was to brainstorm about potential strategic 
scenarios–which the strategists called “strategy prototypes”–by using the 
findings of the analyses. Furthermore, as explained in chapter 4.1, the initial 
plan foresaw that the CEO would “inject” the vision and purpose statements at 
this moment, since these were to act both as guidance and as a boundary 
frame for exploring strategy prototypes. 
The prototype stage started right after the analysis review, during the second 
half of the first off-site workshop day. 
4.4.1 The exploration of new strategic options ends up in familiar 
strategic territory 
At the start of the workshops the CEO told the group that he was “not yet 
ready with the vision and purpose statements” and asked them to proceed 
without the statements, adding that, in his opinion, it might even be better not 
having any statements in order not to limit their imagination and creativity. 
This caused a “chicken-or-egg“-discussion within the group: should vision and 
purpose guide the prototypes building or vice-versa? The CEO interrupted the 
discussion and urged to proceed with the prototypes; the vision and purpose 
statements was going to be handled later, end of discussion.  
The strategists were given fifteen minutes’ time for individual ideation about 
feasible prototypes, and were asked to write them down on a piece of paper. 
There was no limit set on the number of prototypes that could be given and the 
CEO requested that the strategy team members would “think out of the box”, 
and use the opportunity for exploring also substantially new prototypes.  
Next, each strategist presented his prototypes to the group and shortly 
explained the ideas behind it. The strategists were asked to refrain from 
immediate commenting to avoid premature judgments that might obstruct the 
flow of ideas. 
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The nine team members proposed twenty-one scenarios in total. The number 
of strategy prototypes that were proposed varied per strategist between one 
and three. One of the strategists who had only one scenario admitted later that 
he “didn't really get new ideas”. 
Most prototypes were very similar or had some overlap, and there weren’t 
many radically novel prototypes. This caused frustration with a few strategists, 
who felt that it was a missed opportunity for conceiving new strategic options. 
As one strategist commented: ”it was a good exercise although the outcome 
did not give radically new input” 
While the strategists took a break, the two coordinators categorized the 
twenty-one strategy prototypes along four dimensions: the primary value 
proposition, the dominant business logic, the core offering and target 
customer groups. This allowed reducing the number of prototypes from 
twenty-one to seven, sufficiently distinct, prototypes. The strategists shortly 
reviewed the seven final prototypes and gave them a name, according a 
spontaneous naming convention in the format “selling (product) X to 
(customer group) Y”.  
At this point the workshop came to an end, and the entire group left for a team 
dinner, which was hosted by the CEO as to end the intensive day “in a good 
spirit”. There had been a lot of discussions during the day, which nevertheless 
had proceeded in a mostly constructive way, and without any signs of any 
personal conflicts. The strategists appeared to be glad that the day was over. 
During the dinner, some strategists brought up the prototypes, but apparently, 
most of the strategists didn’t want to talk about it anymore, and one said to 
“just leave it for tomorrow”. 
During the next workshop-day, the objective was to conceive a business model 
for each of the strategy prototypes. The strategists were divided into four 
groups and each group was given the task to create a business model for one or 
two scenarios, using the “business model canvas” method conceived by 
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010). The teams were given two and a half hour to 
complete this task, while the coordinators switched between the teams to 
support.  
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The activity didn’t succeed very well. Several strategists experienced 
difficulties in creating the canvases. Especially the definition of value 
proposition and revenue streams appeared demanding. One explanation for 
the difficulties was that a few members were not entirely familiar with the 
business canvas creation method. As one strategist said: “Maybe we would 
have achieved more if the [canvas] tool was more familiar to the whole team”. 
The other reason appeared to be that many strategist, when looking at the 
strategy prototypes, where “blinded” because of the naming convention for the 
scenarios. Confronted with the “selling X to Y” names, the strategists took X (a 
product) and Y (a target customer group) as reference for building the 
business models. However, most “X’s” in the scenarios were products that 
were currently offered, and most “Y’s” were the usual customer groups. As 
such, many strategist constructed business models based on the assumption 
that “X” could be sold to “Y”, without questioning whether the “X”s (products) 
and “Y”s (customer groups) and the relation between both were still 
strategically valid options, let alone, that they would continue to be so in the 
future.  
After the brainstorming activity, each team presented its business model to the 
entire group of strategists, who reviewed and discussed it. 
None of the strategists attempted to challenge the product-customer 
assumptions, but rather accepted that the products and target customers to 
which the strategy prototypes referred were de facto justifiable. Therefore, the 
business canvas models were in some sense an ex post justification of the 
prototypes, rather than a way of questioning their intrinsic validity, which 
could help to dispose of the ones that proved to be unfeasible or unsuitable. 
The consequence was that the strategy prototypes were mostly variations of 
the current business strategy, but not new alternatives. One strategist, new to 
the company, was not entirely satisfied with this result, and told the others 
that “we didn’t come up with anything new”. However, the other strategists 
dismissed his critique and thought the result was “good enough” and even 
“better than expected”. 
The workshop ended with the seven strategy protoypes and the accompanying 
business models as outcome. These would be used as input for formulating the 
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final strategy. Nevertheless, the group was divided about the results of the 
prototyping activity. Despite the intention to use the results of the analysis 
stage as input for the prototyping, some strategist found that this had not been 
the case. “We didn't really consider the results of the analysis when evaluating 
the prototypes” 
According some strategists, one of the difficulties was that not all strategists in 
the group were capable of exploring new alternatives: 
Participants were not fully engaged when evaluating the prototypes, they 
were kind of stuck with the current situation. We should have thrown 
‘crazy ideas’ to get something really new. Still many prototypes were too 
much what we're doing now… The question is how people could let go of 
the current situation, their current position and responsibilities. 
One strategist found that there had been a lack of commitment to make 
changes: 
We were not really making decisions to make a radical move, we didn't 
really try. 
Another strategist, however, thought that making such radical changes would 
not be realistic:  
We were not really able to take a new angle into the strategy, [but] on the 
other hand this might not be necessary because we cannot not make too 
drastic changes in one step. 
4.4.2 Was the approach for strategy prototyping the right one? 
Although the outcome of the prototyping activity did not fully meet the 
strategists’ expectations, most strategists thought the approach for the 
prototyping activity was good. One of them mentioned that:   
It was good to analyse very ‘black and white’ strategic options. Looking at 
‘black and white’ solutions helped to focus and evaluate real strategic 
options. 
For some strategists, it had been too much, too fast: “We did the prototyping 
quite fast because we were under pressure of the deadline”, “The prototypes 
were not evaluated in enough detail because of lack of time and energy…some 
prototypes were promoted too fast”. 
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One strategist, however, found that it would have been better to split the 
prototyping activity between “ideation” and “discussion” activities, and 
conduct them separately. Another strategist thought that the prototyping 
would have gone better “if there would be an external facilitator [meaning, 
from another function within the organization] … because we are sometimes 
so deep into our current business that it is hard to let go of it”.  
One strategist found that the prototyping didn’t go as expected because not 
everyone was familiar with the activity: 
Prototyping is the basis of good strategy work, but we spent more time on 
learning about prototyping than on creating prototypes. 
As mentioned earlier, also the business canvas modelling activity had been 
problematic because not all strategists were familiar with the method. 
4.4.3 The strategists have difficulties to let go of operative matters 
At the start of every workshop, the strategists were asked to not to use their 
mobile phone and laptop in order to focus on the activities or discussions and 
avoid disturbances. Regular breaks were scheduled to give the strategists the 
chance to make a call or check their mail. Nevertheless, on many occasions 
some of the strategists were–to various extents–handling e-mails or left the 
room to make a call. When asking what they were doing, it became clear that 
they were taking care of operative matters. This behavior sometimes hindered 
the progress of the workshops, for example, when a member was missing 
during a group task because he had to “make an urgent call”. The behavior got 
worse as the workshops proceeded and it caused some annoyance with those 
strategists who wanted to fully focus on the activities. However, one strategist 
found that is normal to take care of those matters because one “can’t be 
supposed to be ‘unreachable’ for such a long time” (in this case, the duration of 
a normal work day).  
One of the strategist thought this behavior had much to do with the fact that 
several strategists were only recently promoted from an operative (middle 
management) role to a top management role: “the team was new and many 
were still too much involved in operative matters. They should learn how to 
delegate those matters to their teams.” 
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4.5 The formulation stage 
4.5.1 Strategizing fatigue and the lack of decision making 
The purpose of the formulation stage was to finalize the new strategy. This was 
to be achieved through two activities. First the number of strategic prototypes 
had to be narrowed down to about five; next, these remaining prototypes (or 
elements thereof) were to be consolidated into a single, new, strategy. The 
major elements of the new strategy were then to be elaborated and 
consolidated in a strategy document that could be released and communicated 
to the organization. 
The first workshop in the formulation stage started with a discussion about the 
business strategies for the business units, which went back and forth between 
the following topics: 
• How to develop the product offering, 
• What is the most favourable relation with business partners, 
• What is the optimal degree of vertical value chain integration, 
• What are the preferred sales channels, 
• How to define pricing models, 
• Which are the revenue models to consider. 
The discussion went in circles and did not spur convergence towards a 
common viewpoint on these themes. This caused some resentment within the 
group. Some strategists told “they were getting tired of this” or wondered 
whether “someone knew where this will end”. Ultimately, no decisions were 
made and many strategists got concerned about the timely progress of the 
project. It was now clear that the envisioned deadline would not be met. The 
CEO, then, proposed to extend the deadline by two months, a proposal that 
required board approval.  
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In preparation for asking board approval, the CEO and the coordinators 
worked out a plan for the remaining activities and their participants. The 
activities that were proposed are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. List of remaining activities to be completed during the extended time 
period of the formulation stage, as proposed to the Board of Directors 
Activity Objective Participants 
1. Define vision and 
purpose 
Define vision and purpose statements, 
because these will help to define the 
content of the strategy 
CEO, 
coordinators 
2. Create the outline of 
the strategy document 
Make a clear listing of all the topics that 
need to be addressed in the strategy 
document and define a logical order in 
which they need to be addressed 
Strategists 
(off-site) 
3. Create business 
strategies 
Define which type of solutions (products 
and services) that will be developed and 
commercialized during the next three 
years, and which technologies will be core 
to these solutions. Define marketing and 
sales approach 
Strategists, 
coordinators 
4. Create the final 
strategy document 
Create the written strategy document 
which will be used to communicate the 
strategy to the organization and initiate 
implementation 
Coordinators 
5. Board approval of the 
strategy document 
Get board approval to release the strategy 
to the entire organization 
CEO, Board 
of Directors 
 
Two weeks later, during the next board meeting, the board approved the plan, 
but demanded a strong commitment form the strategy team to have the 
strategy formulation ready by the new deadline.  
4.5.2 The refusal to make trade-offs 
An important topic, related to the definition of the business strategies, was the 
definition of “trade-offs”3, that is, certain product offerings, customer groups 
or sales channels. The coordinators had emphasized the importance of 
defining clear trade-offs, because in recent years the case company had taken 
on certain projects that not fully matched its capabilities, sometimes resulting 
in substantial financial repercussions.  
Despite stressing the importance of determining the trade-offs, deciding on 
the actual trade-offs turned out to be more difficult than expected. Several 
                                                   
3 The concept of trade-offs is proposed by Porter (2008, 115-116) 
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obvious trade-offs were proposed, but there was a strong hesitation to make 
bolder statements and the few real attempts made by some strategy team 
members were often immediately rebuked by others with the arguments that 
the proposed trade-offs “would hurt the business”. As a result, no substantial 
trade-offs were defined, and one strategist silenced the entire discussion by 
stating that “by defining precisely what we will offer, and to whom, we also 
define what not to offer” (emphasis added). This statement appeared to satisfy 
the other strategy team members, and the discussion about trade-offs was 
ended.  
4.5.3 Spending a weekend out of town–“members only” 
The CEO had proposed to organize one of the formulation workshops during a 
weekend at a resort in the region. The CEO mentioned that “it would be good 
to spend time away from office”. Only the strategists were invited to the 
workshop. Since the researcher was not able to participate in this workshop, 
there is no observational data about it. Nevertheless, an informal inquiry 
learnt that the team had found agreement on the outline and content of the 
strategy document, but had also discussed other organizational topics, not 
directly related to the strategy. Furthermore, some participants of the off-site 
workshop commented that it had been “good to be away from office with only 
the [strategists]”, because it had allowed them to focus more on the tasks at 
hand than when being in the office the weekend: “being off-site was very 
efficient, people get less distracted by phone or mail, this could have been 
done more often”. Although not confirmed, the away-days appeared to have 
had a kind of team-building effect within the group. The outline for the 
strategy document that was decided upon during the away-days consisted of 
six sections with a specific content, as shown in Table 5.  
No explicit distinction had been made between the corporate and the business 
strategic content of the strategy, but the strategists’ assumption was that the 
section on “vision and purpose” was considered as addressing the corporate 
strategy aspect while the other sections focused on the business strategy 
aspect.  
 
71 
 
 
 
Table 5. Outline of the new strategy document 
Sections Content 
1. Vision and Purpose • Vision statement 
• Purpose statement 
2. Markets • Geographical indication of primary and secondary 
sales markets 
• Main competitors in various geographic areas 
3. Offerings • Definition of customer segments, according type of 
customer and main value proposition 
• Description of the offering portfolio for each segment 
4. Sales & Marketing • Description of sales and marketing approach for 
each segment 
5. Innovation • Technology roadmap 
• Solution development roadmap for each business 
unit 
6. Strategic 
capabilities 
• Targets for strategic capability development 
 
4.5.4 Making strategic choices: what comes first, existing products or 
future customers? 
As explained in 4.5.1, the first workshop about business strategies had ended 
without any clear decision. During the second attempt, the strategists agreed 
that the four topics to discuss were: markets, offerings, sales & marketing and 
innovation.   
The discussion started well, and several decisions were made, but the 
discussion about the segmentation (part of offerings) and solution 
development roadmaps (part of innovation) was problematic. The first 
question was what had to come first: customer segmentation (the grouping of 
target customer groups that shared common characteristics) or the solution 
development roadmaps (the plan for products and services to be developed 
and commercialized in the next years). Customer segmentation was new to the 
case company, and the strategists had little experience with the concept of 
customer segmentation. Some strategists argued that customer segments were 
to be defined first, in order to determine which products and services had to be 
developed and commercialized. As one strategist said: “The customer is the 
focal point in our strategy, this is a must for any strategy”. Others gave as 
counterargument that they had to start from the products because products 
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“are something what we have”, which “would not change overnight”, while 
customer segmentation “was something new” and thus it would be logical to 
“start with what we have and [then] adapt the rest [i.e. segments] to that”. This 
caused some discussion until the CEO suggested to split the group and work 
on both tasks in parallel: the sales and marketing oriented strategists were to 
work on segmentation because they were most knowledgeable about 
customers and the three business unit executives would separately work on the 
roadmaps of their respective product line, because they were most 
knowledgeable about development and commercialization plans.  
4.5.5 The power play between strategists triggers discussion about the 
business strategy, but ends up in disarray 
Upon completion of the group work, the CEO requested that, first, each 
business unit executive briefly presented his roadmap. While not intended, 
each business unit executive started to pitch the (strategic) importance of his 
own business unit to the rest of the strategists. For instance, one point of 
discussion was the strategic importance of traditional products that had been 
the cornerstone of the company for decades versus the importance of new type 
of solutions (e.g. more service based) that were still in their infancy but might 
lead the company to future successes.  
Strategist A: “I think we need to put more effort on these [traditional 
products], we know they bring revenue… they have been doing so for 
decades.” 
Strategists B: “… But that was the past, why should we assume it will 
remain like that… and…well, you can’t say that sales [of the traditional 
products] has been that great recently.” 
Strategist A: “Nothing has been selling well recently, the economy is what 
it is, but at least we know [these traditional products] have potential, they 
always had, but do you think [the suggested new products of the other 
business unit] will do better? That remains to be seen… and even if so, it 
will take time [to increase sales of the new products] and until then we 
need to get revenues from something.”  
Strategist C (to strategist A): “… what you talk about is ‘blast of the past’… 
we can’t just wait and wait and assume that [the traditional products 
promoted by strategist A] will be selling forever like they did in the past, 
we need to think what customers want in five years from now.” 
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As such, one could observe a kind of competition between the business unit 
executives during the presentation, and the atmosphere in the room was 
slightly nervous. This was the first time there was a sense of conflict between 
several strategists, during which that tangible aspects of the business strategy 
were actively discussed. Some strategists welcomed the discussion, as one 
said: “although there was a lot of struggling, I liked the fact that there was lots 
of discussion”. Most other strategists, however, refrained from engaging in the 
discussion–which then lost its momentum–and several attendees expressed 
their eagerness to “just get it over with”. Therefore, despite the discussions, 
the roadmaps were approved as they had been presented. This caused 
dissatisfaction with some strategists who found that “the roadmaps were not 
sufficiently elaborated” and that “roadmaps were not addressed properly”. 
Later, one of the strategists told in hindsight that “the roadmaps… remained 
too vague, too brief…this is the area in the strategy formulation that is the 
weakest” while another found that the discussion about the roadmaps had 
been productive but had not been brought to a proper end: 
The shortcoming in the strategy is mainly related to the roadmaps, which 
are too superficial. They would need more clarity and focus, linking them 
to segments... The reason for this is that the results of the discussions were 
not clearly depicted. 
Many strategists agreed that at this point the formulation of the business 
strategies had stalled. With no time left, the content of the business strategies 
was wrapped up hastily, often by just bringing in common elements from the 
existing strategies. As one strategist said: 
Novel solutions were much discussed in the start of the strategy project but 
they were not further elaborated enough and neither translated into real 
new business opportunities, this was a fundamental miss in a crucial stage 
of the company [… ] we didn't depart drastically from the existing business 
strategies, we were just under pressure to get the strategy out. 
or as was told by another strategist:  
During the formulation stage the strategy process jump in fast forward, 
which left some gaps, some items were left unaddressed, for instance 
business line strategies. 
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According one strategist the result was that “the [new] strategy still does not 
give sufficient direction, especially for the business units, what are they 
supposed to do and what not?” 
4.5.6 Vision & purpose statements again postponed  
According the new plan, the first topic to address in the formulation stage had 
been, once again, the vision and purpose statement. As mentioned earlier, it 
had been the CEO’s task to define the vision and purpose statement at the very 
beginning of the strategy process, but so far, he had been reluctant to do so.  
To the surprise of the coordinators, the CEO was again not eager to make any 
statement at the start of the formulation stage. His comment was that “I have 
something in my mind for a while, but I feel I cannot decide this just by 
myself”. The coordinators reminded the CEO of the fact that this activity had 
been on the table for a while now, and stressed its importance because vision 
and purpose statements had been supposed to guide the prototyping and 
formulation stage. The CEO, however, refused to give in, and requested to 
make the vision and purpose definition a task of all the strategists.  
The issue of the missing vision and purpose statement was raised during every 
meeting in the formulation stage, but every time the CEO requested its 
postponement. Ultimately it was only in one of the last meetings of the 
formulation stage that the vision and purpose statement got defined. The 
initiative did not come from the CEO but from one strategists who brought up 
the issue of the missing vision and purpose statement. The strategist presented 
his personal idea what do the case company’s vision and purpose might be. 
This triggered a positive response of the other team members. The 
coordinators decided to take advantage of the momentum within the group to 
propose an exercise to define the vision and purpose. The strategists were 
asked to individually reflect on a vision and purpose statement for 15 minutes, 
after which each member presented what he had come up with. It turned out 
that the individual concepts of vision and purpose of the strategists were well 
aligned with each other. As a result, the vision and purpose statements could 
be finalized with full consent of all strategists. The vision statement called for 
deploying advanced technology as a differentiating factor. Although this had 
been a tacit assumption throughout the renewal process (technology had 
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traditionally been regarded as the differentiator factor in the company’s 
offering), it turned the assumption now into a fact. 
The strategists had different opinions about the consequences of postponing 
the vision and purpose statements until the very end of the formulation 
process. Most strategists didn’t see it as too much of an issue. One strategist 
believed that there had been tacit consensus about the vision and purpose of 
the case company throughout the process: “Vision and purpose could have 
come earlier, but there was a kind of tacit consensus during the process, so it 
might not matter that much”. One strategist, however, disagreed. He found 
that having an explicit vision and purpose statement earlier in the process, as 
was planned, would have guided the process of formulation the strategy much 
better: “…we failed in the formulation of vision, and purpose although these 
affect all aspects of the way we want to do business”. 
4.5.7 Wrapping it all up: releasing the new strategy 
With the business strategies defined and the vision and purpose statement 
addressing the corporate strategy aspect of the strategy, the one remaining 
topic was the plan for developing strategic capabilities. No separate discussion 
was held to discuss the strategic capabilities because the strategist told found 
that this had been sufficiently discussed during the analysis of the capabilities.  
The strategists agreed that all elements for the new strategy were clearly 
enough defined and that the strategy document could be compiled by the 
coordinators. When the draft document was ready, it was reviewed by the 
strategists, who suggested a few stylistic improvements but approved the 
content. Next, the CEO presented the strategy document to the board of 
directors, who approved the document for release to the organization and 
asked to plan for the next activity: implementation of the new strategy. 
4.6 Reflection on the strategy formulation process in its 
entirety 
During the interviews, the strategists commented on the entire process as well. 
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4.6.1 The importance of group cohesion 
Some strategists indicated that group cohesion–which they often called “being 
aligned”, or achieving “alignment”–had been important throughout the 
process 
…there was a lot of emphasis on creating alignment. 
Strategy is much about building a common view, combining one's own 
and that of others. 
It must be noted here that in the very beginning of the formulation process the 
strategists used the term “alignment” as synonym for “consensus”. For 
instance, in the briefing stage (see 4.2.1) “alignment” meant “consensus in the 
group about the scope and outline of the strategy renewal project”. Later in the 
process, however, the strategists used the term “alignment” to refer to “group 
cohesion”, in the sense of “having a bond between strategist, being united as a 
team of strategists”. 
Some strategists considered group cohesion to be more important than 
achieving results: 
Personally, I feel that not only the result counts but also the process 
because alignment and standing together behind the strategy is 
important.  
The outcome of some meetings and workshops was a bit disappointing but 
still it progressed towards alignment. 
The process improved the group dynamics [between the strategists]. 
On the other hand, some found that alignment may have hindered decision 
making: 
… we kept going in circles about the same subject without proceeding, 
probably because we wanted to get aligned before to move on… 
4.6.2 The need for involvement of the middle management and the 
Board of Directors 
Despite the initial intentions to systematically involve the middle management 
in the strategy process (see for example 4.2.2), actual involvement was much 
limited to the analysis stage, when several middle level managers contributed 
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to the analysis activities. Several strategists thought that involvement of the 
middle management could have been stronger, as one strategist explained: 
The middle management was involved in the analysis stage, but should 
have been also involved in the prototyping stage. We planned to have 
interaction during the process, but in the end, each of us decided for 
himself how much was communicated about the strategy process with his 
[middle management team] members, and some… did not really discuss 
with their members. 
One strategist thought lack of involvement could have repercussions for 
implementation of the strategy: “the middle management could have been 
involved more, especially for creating commitment during later 
implementation.”  
On the other hand, some strategist thought that more involvement would 
make the strategy formulation process less efficient: “maybe we should have 
involved the middle management more but then again, too much involvement 
hinders decision making”. 
The involvement of the Board of Directors appeared unclear to most 
strategists. Many commented that they hadn’t been given a chance to interact 
with the board directly, since all communications about the strategy process 
had gone via the CEO: 
The CEO had regular checks with the board of directors, but what we 
heard depended on the CEO, we had no direct communication with the 
board. I really would have liked to hear feedback from the board in 
person, have a real discussion, already right in the beginning, to hear 
what they expected. 
Some strategist thought that the involvement of the board could be stronger in 
strategic development:  
The board should have a stronger strategic role, for instance in 
challenging the assumptions and choices we made long the process, as a 
kind of sparring partner. 
4.6.3 Can strategy formulation and implementation be separated? 
Many strategists had doubts whether the new strategy could be realistically 
implemented, because its implementation had been only marginally 
considered during the formulation process: 
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…[another] shortcoming is a plan for implementation. This would have 
required more discussion, but we ran out of time, and there was a lack of 
ideas how to step from concept to implementation. It turned out to be more 
difficult than thought at first. 
Some strategists thought the strategy was too abstract, and could be 
interpreted in many ways, which would hinder its correct and timey 
implementation.  
4.6.4 Time: too much, too less 
The strategists had different opinions about the amount of time allocated for 
the project. Some found that the whole process had taken too long: “The 
process could be shorter in terms of calendar time.” 
For others, however, it was good that the process had been given more time 
than initially planned: 
The outline was quite ambitious [short] in the beginning, but strategy 
development needs a minimum amount of time. The final timeframe was 
better and lead to a better result. 
Some found that the pace was too fast: “We were sometimes in a hurry 
working towards the final strategy. With nine people, it is not so evident.” 
For some the workshops were too long. One strategist commented that: 
There is always a limit to the work that can be done productively. For 
example, 4 to 6 hours is about the limit for a productive day of workshop, 
although it might not always feasible as it increases the number of 
workshops. 
In general, however, most strategists were satisfied with the frequency of the 
meetings and workshops during the strategy formulation process.  
4.7 Traits of the content of the newly formulated strategy 
The tangible result of the strategy formulation process was the new strategy, 
which was compiled as a 70-page slide set or “strategy document”, approved 
by the board of directors, and released to the case company’s organization. As 
such, the strategy document was the official strategy statement of the case 
company.  
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As explained in 3.3.3 the categories for assessing the content of the strategy 
was defined through document analysis. A review of four literature sources4 
allowed determining a so-called “theoretical literature case”, that is, a 
reference case (strategy) that is constructed based on propositions in the 
selected literature. The actual case–the strategy that was formulated by the 
case company–can then be compared against the theoretical literature case. 
This allowed comparing to which extent the proposed traits of corporate and 
business strategy are present in the actual strategy.  
4.7.1 Presence of traits of corporate strategy in the newly formulated 
strategy 
As can be seen in Table 6, the new strategy had almost all the traits of 
corporate strategy that are proposed by literature, albeit to a varying extent. 
The vision and purpose statement succeeded well in demonstrating how the 
case company aims to contribute to the broader society and its role and 
importance in society.  
A major shortcoming was that the strategy did not clearly specify how the case 
company was intended to evolve from its present state towards the future. 
Differentiation from competition in the industry was said to be achieved 
through developing technologically advanced products, but in a technology 
driven industry this may be a weak argument. Most of the “strategic” choices 
that were stated were quite commonplace–for instance, improving operational 
excellence, or achieving sales leadership–and one can doubt what was their 
strategic value, if any. These “strategic choices” were to be realized through 
improving certain organizational capabilities. Therefore, the relationship 
between strategic choices and the organizational capabilities was established. 
Nevertheless, the target level of the capabilities had no relationship to industry 
or competitor benchmarks, and it was unclear whether these choices would 
actually contribute to achieving competitive advantage in the industry.  
The remaining traits of corporate strategy were all addressed in the strategy, 
but were less explicit or only vaguely described. The strategy gave some 
                                                   
4 The literature sources are: Hofer & Schendel (1978, 42); Andrews (1987, 27-34); Porter 
(2008, 115-116) and Rumelt (2012, 11-22), see also 3.4.2 
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guidance in the form of broad policies, but they were vague and could be 
interpreted in different ways. Robustness was weak because most statements 
that were made in the strategy were presented without demonstrating the 
reasoning behind it. 
In summary, for the most part, the corporate strategy content suggested that 
strategic action would focus on the improvement of internal processes, which 
was to be achieved through the development of organizational capabilities. 
Table 6. Presence of traits in the case company's newly formulated corporate 
strategy 
Traits of corporate strategy 
proposed by literature  
Presence of traits of corporate strategy in the 
case company’s strategy 
Trait strongly 
present 
Trait weakly 
present 
Trait absent 
The strategy explains the firm’s 
relation to society x   
The strategy outlines the firm’s 
journey from its present state 
towards the future 
  x 
The strategy supports positive 
differentiation within the firm’s 
industry 
 x  
The strategy relates the firm’s 
strategic choices to the firm’s 
capabilities 
 x  
The strategy provides explicit 
guidance for the organization  x  
The strategy is robust  x  
 
4.7.2 Presence of traits of business strategy in the newly formulated 
strategy 
The traits of business strategy were very weakly present in the case company’s 
strategy; three out of four traits were absent. There was a weak indication on 
how the business units aimed to achieve competitive advantage, but again, it 
was merely based on statements that were given without proper 
argumentation.  
The strategy gave no indication what were the objectives for the business 
units, which specific strategic choices they intended to make. Consequently, 
the relationship between strategic choices and capabilities was as well absent. 
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There was an assumption that capabilities were a corporate matter, and thus 
all business units were supposed to benefit equally from the development of 
companywide organizational capabilities.  
No specific business unit policies were defined. In summary, what was 
considered as “business strategies” was rather a listing of products to be 
offered for the newly defined customer segments. There was faint indication 
that each business unit would focus on a specific segment. However, the 
definition of the business units was based on the products they developed and 
customers in the various segments often required combination of products 
from different business units. Therefore, the segmentation raised more 
questions than it had solved.  
Table 7. Presence of traits in the case company's newly formulated business 
strategy 
Traits of business strategy 
proposed by literature  
Presence of traits of a business strategy in the 
case company’s strategy 
Trait strongly 
present 
Trait weakly 
present 
Trait absent 
The strategy defines tangible 
growth & profit objectives   x 
The strategy defines the basis 
for competitive advantage  x  
The strategy relates the 
business units’ strategic choices 
to their capabilities 
  x 
The strategy provides specific 
guidance for the business unit’s 
organization 
  x 
 
4.7.3 Reflection on the traits of the newly formulated strategy during 
interviews  
During the semi-structured interviews the strategists were asked about the 
content of the newly formulated strategy. 
In general, all strategists were relatively satisfied with the content of the 
strategy they had formulated, although several interviewees mentioned that 
there were still shortcomings. One strategist, however, expressed that it is 
normal to have shortcomings in the strategy content: “this [strategy] is just a 
foundation, there are still things to develop, which is normal”. Another 
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strategist commented that “it’s impossible to write down everything but well, 
the direction is clear, this is strategy”.  
Some strategists commented that the content of the new strategy was (too) 
much focused on the corporate aspects, while the business aspect had 
deficiencies: ”the strategy is OK on a corporate level, but on the business level 
some items deserve more attention”. This was confirmed by another strategist 
who said that:  
The business [unit] strategies need to be deepened. Now it is not really 
specific about which industry and market we will focus on. It is too broad 
and vague. 
Another strategist found that the business strategy did not provide real 
guidance because it lacked clear and measurable objectives: “The [business] 
strategy would need some traditional target setting, [something] that is 
measurable”. 
Going more in details, some strategists found that, even though the 
competition had been analysed, it hadn’t been clear what kind of competitive 
advantage was to be pursued. Two strategist commented that “there is no 
logical conclusion yet [on how competitive advantage will be achieved]” and 
that “the strategy doesn’t go deep into what sets us apart from the 
competition”. 
There were no comments related to capabilities, although some strategists 
pointed out that few attention had been paid to looking for internal synergies 
between product lines. One strategist mentioned that “the potential for 
synergies has not really been explored”. Another strategist talked about 
external synergies in the form of partnerships within the industry: “we need 
partnerships to make this company a better company, but how [to achieve 
that]?”. 
Some strategists commented that the strategy did not yet gave guidance on 
strategic response to the external environment: “all opportunities and threats 
in the industry are not really thought true”. One strategist thought that 
response was not defined because of lack of understanding of the industry 
dynamics: “opportunities in the industry may not be well known and 
understood”. 
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In hindsight, the CEO told that the board, despite its approval of the new 
strategy, had commented that “the strategy was too abstract, they expected 
more tangible actions, and plans how we intended to achieve the strategic 
objectives”. These items were now to be taken care of (or to be rectified) 
during the implementation. This was acknowledged by another strategist who 
told that: “during the implementation we will eventually discover missing 
items [in the strategy]”. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Answering the research question 
In this chapter I will answer the research question by firstly providing the 
answers to the two sub-questions, which then will allow answering the main 
research question.  
5.1.1 Answering the first research sub-question 
The first sub-research question is: “Which practices can be distinguished 
during the strategy formulation process conducted by a newly appointed top 
management team?” To provide the answer to the first sub-question, the 
practices are discussed in the order as they occurred during the consecutive 
stages of the strategy formulation process. 
The purpose of the briefing was to inform all the strategists about the scope 
and the outline of the strategy formulation project. Nevertheless, it appeared 
that the briefing was not just informative, but also displayed ritualistic 
elements: in this first meeting of the strategy process, the participants were 
being acknowledged as “the strategists”, who were to develop the new strategy 
for the new organization. Since the strategists were part of a newly appointed 
top management team that could not fall back on a prior proof of strategy-
making capability, the strategists apparently attempted to justify their 
appointment as strategists. For instance, the strategists randomly used 
strategic management jargon and mentioned articles in business magazines. 
Building on social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael 1989, 27; Hogg & Terry 
2000, 125), the behavior of the strategists indicated that they were going 
through a process of creating a new social identity as strategist, through a 
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symbolic discourse in which the new strategists attempted to stereotype 
themselves as “strategists”. As such they displayed the behavior that they 
thought is characteristic for a strategist. This might also explain the strategists’ 
unstructured, fast-paced, discourse–especially in the first briefing–during 
which they expressed various opinions on how the strategy process should be 
conducted and which topics should be addressed. The group dynamic bore a 
lot of similarities with Gersick’s (1988) observations of newly formed teams. 
Just like the strategists’ in the first briefing, the teams observed by Gersick 
brought up many unrelated topics and approaches during their first project 
meeting, despite the clear outline of the meeting: “discussions were more like 
pinball games than orderly progressions” (ibid., 20). Indeed, the strategists re-
acknowledged and re-approved the reasons for the strategy renewal and the 
approach to achieve it, despite that fact that they had been told that the 
rationale and approach were already decided and approved by the board, and 
thus could not be challenged in the briefing.  
The presence of the CEO in the second briefing seemed to moderate this kind 
of behavior, since the participants were more cautious in their discourse.  One 
of the possible explanations might be that participants avoided to be 
challenged by the CEO, who may have been regarded as the most experienced 
strategist. Johnson et al. (2010, 1592) use the term “anti-structure” to refer to 
a temporary state in which hierarchical differences between participants in 
strategy workshops are leveled out, allowing all members to engage equally 
and efficiently in the activities unhindered by differences in status. A CEO’s 
behavior can play an important role in achieving a state of anti-structure in 
workshops (ibid., 1608). As can be seen, this state of “anti-structure” was not 
yet achieved in the second briefing. Instead, the CEO tended to manifest 
himself as the leader in the group, which appeared to limit the other 
participants’ engagement in the discussion.  
In general, the observed group behavior during the briefings was much in line 
with what Tuckman (1965) describes as the first stage in the formation of new 
groups, called the “forming” stage. On a group level, the members test each 
other’s reactions to find out the roles and accepted behavior in the group. On a 
task level, the emphasis is on “orientation”: the group members try to 
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understand what determines the task execution, how they will solve the task as 
a group and which kind of information they need for solving it. (386.) As 
observed, the individual strategists brought up the themes that they wanted to 
have addressed during the strategy development and suggested several 
approaches for conducting the formulation process, and by doing so, probed 
the viewpoints and reactions of the other strategists. At the same time, a form 
of “communitas”, i.e. group-level commitment towards the strategy renewal 
project, was being established (Johnson et al. 2010, 1612). 
One particular item that was discussed was the participation of the middle 
management in the strategy formulation process. Although the strategists did 
mention that participation of the middle management was important, their 
discourse indicated that they regarded themselves (“we”) as the “gatekeepers” 
of the strategy process who were to decide about whom would be allowed 
(“they”) to participate in the process and to which extent. The kind of 
discourse was similar to the type of discourse that Mantere and Vaara (2008) 
defined by “mystification”. “Mystification” tends to prevail in organizations 
that consider strategy work as the “secretive activity” of a top management 
that allows only limited participation from other organizational actors and 
thereby thus obstructs participation. (347.) In that sense, despite the 
discussion, the real intention of the strategists to involve the middle 
management in the strategy formulation process appeared to be limited.  
The next stage in the strategy formulation process was the analysis stage. 
Already during the briefing, some strategists had emphasized the need for 
analysis, but others had expressed doubts about the feasibility to conduct 
analysis within the given timeframe and with few resources, or even 
questioned whether the business environment was “analyzable” at all. At the 
start of the strategy formulation project, the strategists had admitted that they 
could not gather all the required information about the environment by 
themselves and had decided to involve middle management members. This 
was a correct approach, in line with Mintzberg’s (1990) argument that a 
limited group of executive managers has not the time nor all the skills to 
perform a sufficiently accurate scan of the firm’s environment and Rindova’s 
(1999) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) viewpoint that lower layers of management 
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and experts can contribute to the strategy formation process by bringing in 
their specific knowledge.  
Nevertheless, the strategist did only marginally consider the results of the 
analysis, despite all the analysis work that was carried out by the middle 
managers. One reason for doing so might be that the strategists thought that 
the results had too many flaws or were incomplete and thus were reluctant to 
use the results. Nevertheless, research indicate that interaction can have 
benefits for both strategists and middle managers (e.g. Burgelman 1988, 
Woolridge 2008, Raes et al. 2011), while conflicts between managerial levels 
may negatively impact strategic change (Floyd & Lane 2000). One might 
remember that several strategists had themselves been recently working in 
middle management roles and were only promoted to the top management 
team just before the start of the strategy renewal project, while two strategists 
were still in a middle manager role. Therefore, one would have expected that 
these strategists had a good bond with the middle managers in the 
organizations and would make use of this bond during the strategy 
development activities. Such was, however, not the case. Instead, the newly 
appointed tended to distinguish themselves more and more as a closed team of 
“strategist” that set itself apart from the “non-strategists” in the organization. 
This kind of conflict between new and previous roles is common as individuals 
go through a process of de-identifying themselves with their old role in order 
to fully adopt their new role (Ashforth & Mael 1989, 31). Furthermore, the 
mere fact that many new strategists shared the same background with the 
middle managers may well have intensified the strategists’ desire to 
distinguish themselves from the middle managers. In that sense, conflict and 
competition between the in-group of strategists and the out-group of middle 
managers may even emerge without objective reasons, but just because of the 
strategists’ desire to profile themselves as a separate entity in the organization. 
(ibid., 32-33.)    
During the review of the analyses, the strategists focused for the most part on 
the capability analysis, in which they had insisted to be the main evaluators. 
The assessment of the capability levels had caused difficulties due to the lack 
of industry benchmarks against which to evaluate. The lack of benchmarks 
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was related to the fact that the collected information about the competitive 
environment was incomplete, and might even be flawed. Knott (2015) suggests 
that proper assessment of strategic resources can indeed be problematic when 
they are not benchmarked against similar resources in the competitive 
environment. As noted earlier, there was almost no comprehensive 
information about competitors’ strategic capabilities, although the strategist 
had acknowledged that this kind of information was crucial for strategy 
development, at the start of the process. The lack of information and 
differences in rating practices of the strategists led to moments of conflict 
between some of the strategists, who criticized each other for giving incorrect 
ratings. 
The fact that conflict arose at this particular moment in the process may be 
linked to the formation dynamics of this newly appointed group of strategists. 
In Tuckman’s (1965) group development model, the emergence of conflict 
between group members is typical for the second stage in group formation, 
referred to as “storming” (386). On a group level, this stage is characterized by 
conflicts between members, who negotiate with each other in order to find out 
what others want to get out of the group process, and may resist control of 
other group members (Buchanan & Huczynski 2004, 305). 
Despite the intense discussions about the capability analysis, the strategists 
acquiesced when confronted with missing and flawed competitor information, 
and did not consider this as an issue for continuing the strategy process. 
Nevertheless, one would assume that developing a well-founded, shared, 
understanding of the external, competitive, environment would be important 
for this new team of strategists. Each new strategist had joined the top 
management team with his individual beliefs about the firm’s position in the 
industry, about the strategic stance of competitors and about the competitive 
dynamics within the industry. Presumably, for many newly appointed 
strategists these beliefs were influenced by experiences encountered in 
previous operative roles, and–as Hambrick & Mason (1984) point out–by 
individual mechanisms of perception and interpretation. Instead of trying to 
establish a common understanding of the competitive environment, the 
strategists moved on by relying on their (individual) assumptions about the 
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environment. As suggested by the concept of sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005, 
214), the strategists–who were now confronted with ambiguous information–
appeared to be willing to accept plausible explanations over accurate 
explanations in order to move on with the process. The acceptance of 
plausibility may also indicate that the group–which had overcome a moment 
of conflict related to the capability analysis–was now evolving into what 
Tuckman (1965) calls the “norming” stage, during which group cohesion 
develops. In this stage, the group is establishing itself an entity. Harmony in 
the group is very important in this stage and sustained by avoiding conflicts. 
(386-387.) As such, the strategists may have refrained from engaging in a 
discussion about the external environment. 
In summary, it appears that this stage of the strategy formulation process 
determined where the focal point of the strategy renewal was to be situated. 
The internal environment was the most well known to most strategists, since 
they came out of operational roles and had first-hand access to information 
about the internal environment. The external environment was, however, 
more difficult to understand. The strategists had no consistent data to 
challenge their individual beliefs of the external environment but neither 
appeared to have no intentions to break the status quo and engage in actively 
exploring and discussing the external environment. Instead, the strategists 
appeared to be satisfied with the plausible explanations at hand. As such, 
practices of information exploitation succeeded in this stage, but practices of 
information exploration failed. Although extant research has not directly 
addressed the relationship between cohesion and the balance between 
explorative and exploitative practices, research by Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and 
Bourgeois (1997, 58-59) suggests, however, that low-conflict top management 
teams tend to use less explorative practices, are less aware of their competitive 
situation or even neglect it, and consequently make less optimal strategic 
choices while becoming themselves predictable competitors. The reluctance to 
involve other organizational actors (e.g. middle managers) in explorative tasks 
may have play a role in this as well. While the strategists’ desire for self-
identification may have obstructed involvement of the middle management, 
the emergence of cohesion in the group may have as well contributed to this.  
Although no positive relationship is found between intragroup cohesion and 
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intergroup competition (e.g. competition between strategists and middle 
managers), research suggest that highly cohesive groups are likely to evaluate 
members of their own in-group more positively than members of the out-
group (e.g. middle managers), and may be less cooperative towards members 
of the outgroup (Dion 1973, 170-171). Therefore, cohesion development may 
have further inhibited the participation of the middle management, or for that 
matter, any group or individual that could contribute to the strategy 
development. 
The prototyping stage had been conceived as the major ideation and 
experimentation phase in the formulation process. Nevertheless, the strategic 
scenarios–“prototypes”–that were proposed by the strategists were very 
conventional scenarios, or scenarios that were common within the industry.  
Such outcome is not unusual, because in several studies strategists have been 
seen to narrow down the potential strategic options to those options that are 
common within their industry (Hodgkinson & Sparrow 2002, 133-136). The 
strategist also barely used the results of the analysis in the development of the 
strategic scenarios. In addition, the strategists did not challenge the existing 
product-market strategy, but rather took it as a reference point to explore 
alternative business models that could fit in the existing product-market 
strategy. This appeared to confirm that the focus of the strategists was directed 
towards the case company’s internal environment.  
The fast-paced sequence of activities in the prototyping stage may as well have 
compromised the outcome. Hodgkinson et al. (1999) advice to foresee time for 
reflection prior to deciding on strategic alternatives, something that was 
neglected in the prototyping activity, but which was nevertheless suggested by 
one of the strategists during his reflection on the prototyping stage. 
Furthermore, it appeared that several strategists struggled with performing 
these creative-explorative practices. As Hodgkinson and Clarke (2007) 
suggest, the cognitive style of strategists may affect decision making and thus 
outcomes. In the case company, it may be so that the more analytical inclined 
strategists were not ideally suitable for this kind of activity which benefits 
form more intuitively oriented strategists. Analytically oriented strategist may, 
however, learn to engage in experimentation over time through training and 
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practice. (248.) In the case company, however, there had not been yet a chance 
to become trained or gain experience through practice.  
The strategists’ continuous focus on the internal environment was as well 
illustrated by their preoccupation with operative matters during the strategy 
meetings and workshops: making calls, sending e-mails, sometimes in an 
ostentatious manner. Ansoff (1987) relates management’s tendency to 
prioritize operative matters over strategic matters to its lack in strategic 
thinking capability, which itself may cause avoidance or postponement of 
strategic decision making until forced by a certain event.  
In summary, although the practice in the prototyping stage was supposed to 
highly explorative in order to break new strategic ground, it resulted in re-
affirming familiar strategic territory. The lack of a guiding vision and purpose 
statement may have worsened this, and, as suggested by Bass (2007) and 
Korbi (2015), one can assume that a (good) vision and purpose statement 
could have provided a kind of aiming point beyond the familiar territory. The 
presence of a skilled facilitator (e.g. an “external facilitator” as one strategist 
told in the interview) who would have motivated the strategists to explore new 
ideas could–maybe–have compensated for the lack of vision and purpose 
statement. Such was not the case, partly because of the decision to work 
without consultant and partly because none of the strategists took initiative to 
challenge the status quo or to motivate the group to look for new strategic 
options. Although the CEO attempted this at the start by requesting the 
strategists to “think out of the box”, he did not repeat his request when the 
strategists failed to do so.  
Some strategists expressed that they had expected that the board of directors 
would have provided input in this stage, or would “challenge” the ideas that 
were on the table. Although advice from the board of directors is found to 
support strategic decision making (Rindova 1999), there was no evidence that 
the board of directors had been much involved in the strategy formulation 
process of the case company up to this point. This was a cause of concern for 
almost all strategists, who were unaware of what had been discussed between 
the board and the CEO–or whether there had been any discussions at all–and 
would have preferred direct interaction with the board members.  
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In summary, while the prototyping stage was by nature a highly explorative 
episode, the strategists did not engage in constructive discussions–and 
conflict–that may have supported the creation of new strategic scenarios. Like 
the analysis stage, it appeared that the emphasis on group cohesion was still 
preventing positive conflict, which consequently inhibited the adoption of 
explorative practices. 
At the start of the formulation stage, the strategists were confronted with the 
fact that no real decisions had been made so far, while time was running out. 
Consequently, the strategists appeared to re-orientate their initial conception 
of the strategy formulation process. As noted earlier, during the briefings, the 
strategists had discussed about which topics had to be addressed in the 
strategy process and what would be preferred approaches, which was the 
initial “orientation”. Confronted with a lack of tangible progress at the start of 
the formulations stage, the strategists seemed to change their conception of 
what had to be done. Gersick (1988) finds that this tendency for re-
orientation–often halfway in the project–is very common in newly formed 
groups that become aware of imminent deadlines, and calls this phenomenon 
“transition” (33-34). During these transitions, teams tend to seek new contacts 
with their “organizational contexts”, usually with the person(s) who had 
assigned the task (ibid., 28). Such was also the case for the strategists who–
through the CEO–contacted the board of directors. Furthermore, just as the 
teams observed by Gersick, the strategists proceeded to complete the 
formulation process following the new plan that was agreed during the 
transition, regardless of what had been discussed in the earlier stages of the 
process. 
Despite the new deadline given by the board, the strategists came still under 
time pressure to formulate the final strategy. This failure to achieve results 
appeared to affect the mood in the group and there were (short) moments of 
conflict. The most explicit conflict emerged between the three business unit 
executives, who apparently engaged in a direct competition about the strategic 
importance of their respective business units. Gersick’s findings (1988, 30) 
suggest that competition between team participants may indeed become 
relatively common in the stage following transition, as the team, still pressed 
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by time, becomes focused on accomplishing its assignment and may become 
less concerned about sustaining harmony in the group. In line with Lewis’ 
(2002, 28) findings, these moments of increased conflict in the group 
appeared to increase the eagerness to achieve strategic decisions. In this case, 
the moment of decision-generation conflict may, however, have come too late 
in the process. Although time pressure and the resulting conflict improved the 
effectiveness of the strategists for a while, it seemed to be offset by the 
overarching striving for group cohesion through conflict avoidance. Unlike the 
teams in Gersick’s (1988, 13) study, which were non-permanent, the 
strategists were to form a permanent team that would continue to exist after 
the strategy process. This may explain why the pursuit of cohesion remained 
strong even in the presence of conflict. According Tuckman’s (1965) group 
formation model, the strategists apparently failed to enter the “performing“ 
stage of group development, which is characterized by striving for efficient 
task-solving and which usually emerges once group-cohesion is firmly 
established (387). Instead, the strategists appeared to be on a tipping point 
between falling back to the cohesion stage and moving on to the productive 
stage. Indeed, several strategists insisted to stop the discussion and “just get 
over it” while others had welcomed this moment productive discussion. 
While the most important practice in the formulations stage was making 
decisions about the final strategy content, it was observed that the group’s 
decision making was slow and, as several strategists expressed, actual 
decisions were only made when time ran out. Eisenhardt (1989, 562) links this 
to deficiencies in the conflict resolution ability, causing decisions to be delayed 
until forced to do so by external events, which in this case was time pressure. 
Although Meissner (2014, 117) suggests that cognitive conflict between 
strategists may enhance decision quality, several strategists indicated that 
conflicts due to time pressure had sped up decision making, but had also 
decreased the quality of the decisions. Therefore, the positive relationship 
between level of conflict and decision quality may be contingent on the conflict 
resolution ability of the strategists. Conflict resolution ability may have indeed 
been an issue in this group of new strategists, which–as noted–emphasized 
group cohesion and therefore avoided conflict. This in turn may have caused 
poor strategic decision making, since less but biased information was accepted 
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for decision making without proper discussion, or important information may 
even have been disregarded. (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois 1997, 58-59; 
Whitney & Smith 1983, 174.) 
When looking back on the entire strategy formulation process, it appears that 
the dynamics of group development had an impact on the kind of practices 
that were employed by the strategists. Firstly, the strategists went through a 
process of constructing their new social identity as strategists. Intertwined 
with the process of assuming their new identity as strategists, the newly 
formed group of strategists went through various stages of group development 
stages. During the group development process, the development of cohesion 
appeared to affect several practices. As mentioned earlier, cohesion 
development is a normal evolutionary stage in the formation process of any 
new groups, but it is usually followed by a productive, solution-focused, 
“performing”, stage once cohesion has been firmly established (Tuckman 
1965). In the present study, this last stage was, however, not reached. 
In this respect, one remaining question is why the group failed to proceed 
from the “norming” (cohesion development) stage to the “performing” 
(productive) stage. A possible explanation might be that certain factors in the 
group or their environment had caused a higher than usual emphasis on group 
cohesiveness. As suggested by Myers et al. (1995, 21), Finnish top managers 
tend to emphasize team spirit and consensual decision making more than 
their European peers. Therefore, it might have been possible that elements of 
national culture may have increased the significance and importance of 
achieving group-cohesion with the strategists. Findings of a cross-societal 
study by Wendt, Euwema and van Emmerik (2009) suggest, however, that 
national culture does not influence the cohesiveness in work-teams. Instead, 
supportive leadership behaviour is found to have a positive effect on group 
cohesion in all cultures. (368.)  
Consequently, one may ask whether the CEO had (over-)emphasized group 
cohesion during the strategy formulation process. As explained in chapter 
3.2.2, before the strategy project started, the CEO had decided to let the newly 
appointed strategists develop the new strategy without consultants because he 
assumed that it would strengthen them as a team. While the CEO might have 
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had the goal to establish cohesion in the group, it appeared that the CEO went 
through a similar process of cohesion development than the other strategists. 
For instance, at the start of the project, the CEO profiled himself as the leader 
in the strategy process, as was demonstrated by his discourse during the 
briefing. It is unlikely that the CEO would consciously display such behaviour 
if his intention was to actively promote cohesion. On the contrary, the 
discourse of the CEO in the briefing in fact hindered the emergence of anti-
structure (i.e. levelling out hierarchical differences) that could enhance the 
development of cohesion. However, as the strategy formulation process 
proceeded, the CEO begun to de-emphasize his higher hierarchical role and 
gradually abandoned his dominant role in the group. His reluctance to 
singlehandedly impose a vision and purpose statement on the group, as well as 
his later decision to make it the task of the whole group appear to indicate that 
the CEO himself had gone through the same stages of group development, 
including the development of cohesion. At the same time, the CEO may have 
purposely displayed more supportive behaviour in order to create an 
atmosphere that favoured the development of cohesion between the 
strategists. Therefore, the CEO may have facilitated the development of 
cohesion, but it is unlikely that he has “pushed” the development of cohesion. 
On the other hand, the fact the CEO gradually “merged” in the group by de-
emphasizing his explicit leader role may have had the unintended effect of 
deteriorating the decision-making ability of the group. The risk of 
“groupthink” and sub-optimal decision making is more likely to occur in 
cohesive groups that lack proper decision making procedures, and in which a 
desire for identification with the group obstructs the endorsement of effective 
leaders (Hogg & Terry 2000, 129-130).  
A last possibility why the strategists did not enter the productive, 
“performing”, stage may be linked to the total duration of the strategy 
formulation, and the fact that it was a rather discontinuous process. The 
strategy formulation was spread out over a seven-month period and 
consecutive strategy workshops or meetings were sometimes separated by 
several weeks of group inactivity. Once cohesion was established, there may 
have been a lack of continuous activity, “momentum”, to support the timely 
progress toward the performing stage, in which the group would work most 
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efficiently. Tuckman (1965, 397) suggest that groups with a short life progress 
faster through the group development stages than groups with a long life. In 
the case of the strategists, the projected life of the group was in fact infinite– 
the group would continue to exist after the strategy project was finished–
which consequently may have slowed down progression. Furthermore, while 
the effect of time pressure can apparently be favourable to increase efficacy 
(Gersick 1988, 30) it appeared to be an issue for the team of strategists, 
possibly because they were “stuck” in the cohesion development stage. For 
them, time pressure–and the risk of conflict that came with it–appeared to be 
above all a threat to cohesion, rather than a stimulus for achieving results. 
5.1.2 Answering the second research sub-question 
Next the second research question will be answered:  What are the traits of the 
strategy content that is formulated by a newly appointed top management 
team? 
The answer to this research question is provided through document analysis of 
the newly formulated strategy, which allows evaluating the traits of its content 
and making a comparison to the traits set forth by literature. The results of the 
document analysis were complemented by interview data. 
The analysis revealed that the content of the newly formulated strategy had 
deficiencies on both a corporate as business level strategy. The major 
shortcoming of the strategy on a corporate level was that it fails to specify what 
the case company’s direction towards the future would be. Furthermore, the 
strategy was dominated by the intention for internal change, through 
development of organizational capabilities. These capabilities were, however, 
not benchmarked against the competitor’s and industry levels. Consequently, 
the strategic value of these capabilities was questionable, and mostly based on 
assumptions. The strategy failed to provide to provide guidance on how the 
firm’s strategic position against the competition or industry was to be 
developed or sustained. On a business strategy level, the new strategy was 
substantially flawed. Many of the topics that are expected in a business 
strategy are missing. As such, the new strategy did not give strategic guidance 
for the business units. 
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The strategists acknowledged many of the deficiencies in the interviews. 
Nevertheless, they did not appear to be worried too much about the 
consequences, but instead considered the implementation phase that followed 
after the formulation phase as an opportunity to take care of unfinished 
matters. The strategy was, however, released in the same form to the entire 
organization, who would evaluate it on face value and would react upon it 
based on what they would read (or not read) in the strategy document.  
5.1.3 Answering the main research question 
The answers to the research sub-questions allows giving the answer to the 
main research question: What is the relationship between the practices that a 
newly appointed top management team employs during strategy formulation 
and the traits of the formulated strategy? The answer is formulated through 
three propositions. 
Firstly, the strategy practices that a newly appointed top management team 
employs during the strategy formulation appeared to be affected by group 
formation processes. Two intertwined processes were identified. The first 
process was the individual team members’ construction of a new social 
identity as “top management team member”, after being promoted from a 
middle management role. The construction of this new social identity 
reinforced the top management team members’ perception of being part of a 
new, distinct group in the firm. This perception appeared to create a divide 
with other organizational groups, especially the middle management. The 
second process that was identified was the group development process. A stage 
that was of particular interest was the stage in which group cohesion started to 
develop. Group cohesion is found to reduce intragroup conflict, and this was 
also observed in the new top management team members, whose members 
began to avoid conflict in order to sustain unity in the group. Similarly, in the 
rare cases that conflict emerged, it was quickly mitigated, again due to the 
intention to sustain cohesion. The consequence was that explorative and 
ideation practices during the strategy formulation were deteriorating, since 
these practices usually require the discussion and integration of conflicting 
viewpoints and opinions. Moreover, the inability to deal constructively with 
conflict was found to have a negative effect on decision making speed. Along 
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all stages of the strategy formulation process, decision making was delayed 
along until forced by imminent deadlines. At those points, decisions were 
made hastily and crucial information was ignored, leading to inferior decision 
quality. Consequently, the combination of restricting participation of other 
organizational actors, the limited use of explorative practices and mediocre 
decision making practices appeared to affect the traits of the content of 
corporate and business strategies made by the newly formed top management 
team. Many traits that are considered essential for corporate and business 
strategy content were only weakly present or were absent. 
Proposition 1: A strategy formulated by a newly appointed top 
management team may lack essential traits of corporate and business 
strategy, since the top management team members’ identification with the 
newly formed team may reduce their willingness to involve other 
organizational actors in the strategy making process and their striving for 
group cohesion may negatively affect their experimentation and decision 
making practices. 
Secondly, newly appointed top management teams may face challenges when 
defining the firm’s strategic position in the external business environment. In 
general, new top management team members gradually construct a shared 
mental model of the business environment through active discussion, 
exploration and consultation with peers and other organizational actors. The 
top management team in this study entirely consisted of new members, 
promoted from middle management roles. As such, they had different 
perceptions of the external business environment, depending on their previous 
roles and experience. The new top management member initially 
acknowledged the need for relevant information about the external 
environment, and asked the middle management to collect this information. 
However, once confronted with the results, the top management team rejected 
and neglected the information. It appeared that the new top management 
team members, after having acknowledged their new role in the organization, 
gradually started to reduce the importance of the middle managers in the 
strategy formulation process. This behaviour was amplified when cohesion 
developed in the top management team, which simultaneously further 
decreased the willingness to explore the external business environment. 
Consequently, the newly formed top management team failed to establish a 
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valid and accurate group-level mental model of the external environment and 
instead based itself on unchallenged assumptions. Consequently, the 
definition of strategic choices about the firm’s strategic position in its 
environment was flawed, and the strategy lacked traits for refining or 
improving the firm’s strategic position against its competitors or within its 
industry. 
Proposition 2a: Members of newly appointed top management teams 
appear to be less apt to construct a common mental model of the external 
business environment, as they are reluctant to engage in explorative 
practices. Therefore, the strategies they formulate may lack the traits that 
are required for refining or improving the firm’s strategic position against 
its competitors or within its industry. 
Thirdly, and related to the second proposition, results of this study suggest 
that newly appointed strategists which are recently promoted from an 
operative to a strategic role are more likely to focus their strategic attention 
towards internal matters. Internal matters are mostly familiar from previous 
operative roles and therefore may appear to be the first choice to control 
through strategic action. This may be enhanced by adoption of the new 
identity of “strategists”, which provides the opportunity to (finally) have the 
ultimate authority to realize the envisioned changes. Top management team 
members in this study were found to engage in positive conflict only when it 
concerned internal matters. The lack of understanding of the external business 
environment, may have shifted the top management team’s focus even more 
on the internal environment. Consequently, the content of the formulated 
strategy may be dominated by traits that are aimed at achieving strategic 
renewal through changes in the internal business environment.  
Proposition 2b: Newly appointed top management teams that are 
composed of strategists who have recently been promoted from an 
operative to a strategic role, may tend to focus their strategic practices on 
the firm’s internal environment. Therefore, the traits of the strategy they 
formulate are more likely to be dominated by actions for achieving 
internal strategic change. 
These three propositions provide the answer to the main research question. 
99 
 
 
 
5.2 Practical implications 
The purpose of this study was to establish a relationship between the practices 
that members of newly appointed top management teams deploy during the 
formulation of a new strategy and the traits of the strategy that emerged. The 
findings of the study suggested that members of newly appointed top 
management teams may not be in a favorable position to handle high-level 
strategic change programs right after they have been appointed, as it may 
negatively affect the traits of the strategy they formulate.  
The practices of newly appointed strategists appear are impacted by the 
combined effect of two group development processes that naturally occur 
when new groups are formed. The first process is the construction of a new 
social identity as top management member, the second the development of 
group cohesion within the new top management team. These processes were 
found to negatively impact explorative practices, decision making practices 
and intergroup collaboration practices. As a result, the strategies formulated 
by newly appointed top management teams may lack the essential traits of 
corporate and business strategy.  
Based on the findings in this study, it may be recommended that newly 
appointed top management teams first take care of establishing themselves as 
a team before engaging in substantial strategic renewal activities. At the same 
time, newly appointed top management teams should be careful not isolate 
themselves, but engage in active collaboration across the organization (and 
beyond), since participation of other actors in strategy renewal process is 
likely to be crucial to achieve successful outcomes. The role of the CEO as a 
supportive but decisive leader appears important for the successful start of a 
new top management team. 
5.3 Assessment of the results in the light of literature 
The results of this study confirmed earlier research findings (e.g. Wiersema & 
Bantel 1992) that short tenure top management teams are less likely to achieve 
strategic change. The findings of this study may provide new insights in the 
underlying reasons for this relationship. As demonstrated, theory of group 
dynamics (Tuckman 1965; Tuckman & Jensen 1977), theory of punctuated 
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equilibrium (Gersick 1988) and social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael 1989; 
Dion 1973; Hogg & Terry 2000) proved to be valuable for explaining the 
behavior that influenced the newly appointed strategists’ practices of strategy 
formulation. The results of this study also supported research findings on 
strategic decision making (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt, Kahwajy & Bourgeois 
1997).  
Furthermore, this empirical study can contribute to the strategy-as-practice 
framework by providing new insights in the practice of strategy formulation 
through close observation of practicing strategists and the dynamics of their 
behavior, trough linking strategy-making practices and outcomes, and through 
paying attention to the social aspect of strategizing (Chia & MacKay 2007; 
Jarzabkowski and Spee 2009; Jarzabkowski & Whittington 2008; Johnson et 
al. 2010; Rouleau 2013; Whittington 2006). 
5.4 Limitations & future research 
As this study is based on a single case, it must be considered as explorative. In 
this kind of case study, context matters a lot, and even in similar situations 
certain contextual parameters may affect the applicability of the findings. 
Further research could seek to validate the propositions in different settings to 
find out the influence of contextual aspects or alternatively to be able to 
generalize the findings to a wider range of contexts. For instance, it would be 
interesting to study how fast other top management teams progress trough 
different stages of group development and what determines their progress 
through the stages. Although the study has focused primarily on the top 
management team, further research could consider the perspective of other 
organizational actors on the strategy process. Finally, this study has looked at 
only the strategy formulation process, because of the limited amount of time 
that could be allocated to the study. However, it is obvious that in strategy 
renewal processes the implementation of the strategy is as crucial as its 
formulation. Further research could therefore study how implementation is 
affected by formulation.  
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7 Appendices 
Appendix 1. Interview guide 
Part 1: STRATEGY FORMULATION PROCESS 
Interviewer: The purpose of this interview is to reflect on the strategy 
formulation process. The interview covers three aspects. The first is an evaluation 
of the different stages in the process, and the activities that were done in each stage. 
The second aspect is an evaluation of the new strategy and the third aspect is how 
you personally have experienced being part of the formulation process, as a 
strategist.  
I have also a visual aid for you that may help to bring back to mind the meetings 
and workshops in the process. 
Do you have any questions? 
Briefing 
stage 
Interviewer: At the start of the strategy renewal project all 
strategist were briefed about the scope of the project, the different 
stages and the main strategic concepts. 
QB1: did the briefing help you to understand the scope, stages and 
concepts? 
QB2: Do you think that the briefing helped to get members aligned 
as a team? 
QB3: Was there something you would have done different in the 
briefing? 
Analysis 
stage 
Interviewer: During the analysis stage six different analyses were 
conducted to provide insights for the formulating the strategy. 
 QA1: Which of the analysis succeeded best in providing data for 
formulating the new strategy 
QA2: which analysis had the most impact on the formulation of the 
strategy 
QA3: do you think analysis was necessary for formulating the 
strategy? 
QA4: Do you think there were enough data gathered to continue 
formulate the new strategy? 
QA5: did one or more of the analysis give you new insights in the 
internal or external environment of the [case company] 
QA6: what do you think are the most important analysis for strategy 
development in general 
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QA7: were you satisfied with the analysis stage (was there 
something you would have done different) 
Prototyping 
stage 
Interviewer: “ in the strategy formulation stage the team evaluated 
several strategic scenarios. The purpose was to identify potential 
strategic scenarios for [case company]” 
QP1: Do you think there were enough scenarios evaluated? 
QP2: Did you consider some of the results of the analyses for 
defining the scenarios? 
QP3: How did you feel about the evaluation of the scenarios? Was 
there enough discussion? 
QP4: Did the exercise help you to come up with new strategic 
scnearios? How decision were made about the scenarios? 
QP5: did the prototyping stage give valuable input for formulating 
the new strategy? (what kind of input) 
QP6: is there something you would have done different during the 
prototyping stage? 
Formulation 
stage:  
Interviewer: “During the formulation stage the team compiled the 
final version of the new strategy. There were several topics 
discussed, such as vision and purpose, the roadmaps, customer 
segments and sales and marketing approaches” 
QF1: Do you think the results of earlier stages like analysis and 
prototyping were taken into account for the formulation of the 
strategy? 
QF2: Was there enough discussion in the team about the different 
elements of the strategy, such as roadmaps, segments and so on 
before they were integrated into the new strategy (was there 
something that had to be discussed more, or which was missing at 
all). How the decisions were made? 
QF3: Are the vision and purpose statements in line with your 
personal opinion about [case company] 
QF4: do you think it would have been helpful for the strategy 
formulation if the vision and purpose statement would have been 
defined earlier in the process? 
Reflection 
on the 
entire 
process 
Interviewer: “Next I have some questions about the formulation 
process in general” 
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QG1: were the objectives of each workshop and meeting clear for 
you? (do you think the workshops and meetings were well enough 
prepared) 
QG2: do you think there was enough interaction between the team 
members? 
QG3: How do you feel about the interaction with the middle 
management during the formulation process? (was there enough 
interaction? What is the role of the middle management in strategy 
renewal processes) 
QG4: Do you think that the Board of Directors was enough involved 
in the strategy formulation process? (would you have expected more 
feedback form the board? Should the board play a stronger role in 
the strategy development?) 
QG5: how do you feel about the duration of the formulation process 
and the number of meetings and workshops 
QG6: If you look back on the entire strategy formulation process, 
what do you think went well, and what could be improved? 
PART 2: STRATEGY CONTENT 
Interviewer: “The result of the strategy formulation was [case company’s] new 
strategy. Next I would like to ask you about the different topics that are addressed 
in the new strategy, and how they were defined.” 
 QC1: DO you think the strategic choices were based on sufficient 
understanding of the industry in which [case company] is active? 
(did you know enough about threats and opportunities in the 
industry?) 
QC2: DO you think the strategy gives enough guidance on how [case 
company] will deal with opportunities and threats in the industry? 
QC3: Do you think there was enough understanding about how 
competitive advantage can be established in the industry? 
QC4: does the new strategy clearly define which kind of customers 
will be served by the business units? 
QC5: does the new strategy clearly define which markets the 
business units will focus on? 
QC6: How were these customer and markets defined? How did you 
make a decision on these? 
QC7: is the strategy clear on certain customers, markets that not will 
be served or activities that not will done (trade-offs)? 
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QC8: do you think the strategy is clear on how [case company] will 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage? (within industry and 
against competitors) 
QC9: Do you feel the corporate / business unit strategy has unique 
elements that allow the [case company] to differentiate itself from 
competition 
QC9: Do you think the strategy defines specific policies to guide the 
activities for the [case company] and for the business units? 
QC10: Did you evaluate the mid and long term effect of the strategic 
choices on the [case company’s] future? (Will these choices support 
growth, or profitability, or…?)  
QC11: Does the strategy gives guidance on the resources and 
capabilities that are required to realize the [case company’s] strategic 
objectives? 
QC12: Did you take into account the current resources and 
capabilities? 
QC13: Did you take into account the organizational structure and 
process in [case company] when making strategic choices? 
QC14: Do you think the core of the strategy is enough robust, 
meaning it will remain valid over a certain period in time, without 
the need to make new changes too soon? 
QC15: Do you think the strategy still allows for flexibility, that is 
making minor adjustments, without making its core elements 
obsolete? 
QC16:Do you think the strategy document is easy to understand for 
all employees? 
QC17: Do you think the strategy gives tangible guidance for 
employees and managers in different functions? 
QC18: if you look at the complete strategy, do you think it addresses 
all aspects that a strategy should address? On corporate level and on 
business level? Is there anything that would need more attention? 
PART 3: PERSONAL REFLECTION ON BEING STRATEGIST 
Interviewer: “than I have some questions on how you experienced your 
participation in the project” 
 QS1: How did you feel about your strategic management skills when 
the project started? 
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QS2: Do you think that your strategic management skills developed 
during the project? 
QS3: Is strategic management something you can learn by doing, or 
does it require some specific training. Or both? 
QS4: Do you think operative matters sometimes distracted the 
team? 
QS5: Did you participate earlier in strategy formulation processes? 
(if YES –FOLLOW UP: How do you compare this process with 
earlier experiences?) 
QS6: is there still something you would like to mention about the 
formulation process or the new strategy? 
CLOSURE  
Interviewer: “Well, this is almost the end of the interview. Can I still ask you 
some questions about yourself?” 
 QD1: How long have you been employed with [case company]  
(FOLLOW UP: have you been working in other companies than case 
company) 
QD2: Can you tell me how many years’ experience in strategic 
management you have? 
QD3: What is your highest educational degree? 
QD4: and then finally, the last question, can you tell me your age? 
 
